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A Note on Translation and Transliteration  
 
When applicable, I have chosen to use the original author’s spellings of Russian or 
Kazakh names rendered in English. Some names will have changed over time in accordance to 
shifting norms in Latinization - e.g., ​Zoia ​versus ​Zoya.​ I rendered names of people and places to 
avoid diacritics, which can be inconsistently rendered in electronic document form (e.g., 
Manshuk ​Zhiengalikyzy​ ​Mametova instead of Mänşük Jïenğaliqizi Mämetova). Additionally, 
place names remained consistent with the English renderings as they were at the time - e.g., 
spelling the capital of Ukraine as ​Kiev ​when discussing it in the 1940s, but ​Kyiv ​when discussing 
it in the 2010s. In the body of the text, I will use English, with the original Russian included as 






















The people need a hero, a saint - General Skovelev, Feodor Kuzmich, Ivan the Terrible - 
they are alike to them. And the more remote, the more vague, the less accessible the hero, 
the more freedom for the imagination ...There must be a ‘Once upon a time there lived’ 
about it - something of the fairy tale. Not a God in heaven, but here, on our dismal earth. 
Someone of great wisdom and monstrous power. 
 
-Vasilii Breev, as quoted by Gorky in Michael Cherniavsky’s ​Tsar and people: 
studies in Russian myths  1
 
This quote is one that opens Anita Pisch’s analysis of Joseph Stalin as both a warrior and 
saviour in Soviet iconography and historiography. Yet the listed qualities can apply to a number 
of the heroes that came out of the Second World War - more specifically, the Great Patriotic War
, the years between 1941 and 1945 during which the Soviet Union lost millions of its soldiers 2
and citizens. Moscow’s Victory Museum has halls where the names of the glorious dead are 
etched in gold onto white marble, or photographs of young people who are lauded even though 
they never turned twenty-one. Even smaller, localized museums - a few rooms given over to 
memorializing the war in places such as Nizhny Novgorod’s Military Commissariat - punctuate 
their photographs with “Heroism during the Great Patriotic War became mass - the words of 
Vladimir Lenin came true: Russia is able to give not only single heroes...Russia will be able to 
nominate these heroes by the hundreds or thousands…” . Among those photographs and those 3
1 Breev quoted in Anita Pisch, “Stalin Saves the World - Stalin and the Evolution of the Warrior 
and Saviour Archetypes,” in ​The Personality Cult of Stalin in Soviet Posters, 1929-1953: 
Archetypes, Inventions and Fabrications​ (ANU Press, 2016), 291. 
2 Over the course of this essay, I will refer to the “Great Patriotic War” not as an event distinct 
from the Second World War, but to the specific phase of it marked by Germany’s invasion of the 
Soviet Union and the subsequent entrance of the Soviet Union into the larger conflict.  
3 “Героизм в годы Великой отечественной войны стал массовым, сбылись слова 
Владимира Ильича Ленина: Россия способна давать не только одиночек - героев...Россия 
7 
names are curiosities, distinguished from the rest either by the grammatical femininity 
necessitated by their names or the cut of their hair - the women who served, fought, and often 
died for the Soviet Union. For the united socialist republics sent more women into combat during 
the war than any nation before or after, even accounting for the increasing integration of 
contemporary militaries; estimates range from 570,00 to over a million women saw duty in the 
Red Army, as partisans or volunteers, and nearly one hundred were awarded the highest 
distinction for state service, the Hero of the Soviet Union.  Of those women, many are still 4
remembered and discussed in the contemporary states which followed the Soviet Union’s 
dissolution, as subjects of films and political controversies, used to compare today’s women with 
those of the glorious generation. 
Female combatants ranged from 6 to 12%  of total casualties from non-civilians in the 5
war, but in depictions of the war, the female partisan or soldier is nearly always included, even if 
only a token example. Films such as Stanislav Rosotosky’s ​The Dawns are Quiet Here  ​(1972) 6
and Joseph Vilsamir’s ​Stalingrad ​(1993) are to be considered two ends of a spectrum depicting 
сможет выдвинуть этих героев сотнями, тысячами…” Nizhny Novgorod Military 
Commissariat Museum 
4 Anna Reid, “Introduction,” in ​Avenging Angels: Young Women of the Soviet Union’s WWII 
Sniper Corps​, by Lyuba Vinogradova (New York and London: MacLehose Press, 2017), 15–20, 
15. 
5 An exact total of Soviet war dead in the Great Patriotic War is contested and variable. The 
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation puts the total at 26.6 million, 8,668,400 of which 
came from the Armed Forces. The total number of partisans active in the western parts of the 
Soviet Union similarly are difficult to calculate, and can range anywhere from 15,000 to 
550,000.  (​http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/more.htm?id=11359251@cmsArticle​, 
http://www.a-z.ru/women_cd2/12/2/i80_181.htm​, Strobl, 141-142) 
6 Russian: “А зори здесь тихие”. The Russian title’s use of the word ​‘зори’ ​is noteworthy as it 
references the Slavic mythological figures of the Заря́, maidens who herald the coming of dawn. 
This connects the women in the film to the pre-Christian Slavic goddesses and the characteristics 
it implies. 
8 
female combatants in war films, ranging from a full battalion of women to a single entity meant 
to represent the Soviet Union as a whole. Soviet, post-Soviet  and even non-socialists’ (e.g., 7
German or American) memory of the war gives a prominent and permanent position to the girl 
fighter, and they were frequently selected to highlight the patriotism and sense of duty felt by all 
Soviet citizens during the war era. During the years of the war, women were frequently selected 
among the troops and highlighted for achievement at home and abroad. For example, despite 
speaking little English, Lieutenant Lyudmila Pavilchenko, age twenty-five, was selected as one 
of two representatives  to travel to the United States for an international students’ assembly in 
late 1942, as her studies at Kiev University had been interrupted due to the war. Despite fears 
that “women are difficult to control”, as Pavlichenko herself wrote on her selection in her 
memoirs, “if [the selected woman is] good-looking, they will present the USSR in the most 
favorable light”; in America, her appearance became a major curiosity and point of note . Her 8
visit was a chance for Americans to ask innumerable questions and make assumptions about the 
lives of women in the Soviet Union, and also to subscribe qualities to the foreign army; reporters 
could simultaneously critique her lack of a noteworthy physicality (“Isn’t it a part of military 
philosophy that an efficient warrior takes pride in his appearance? Isn’t Joan of Arc always 
pictured in beautiful and shining armor?”) while others could write at length to those qualities 
(“What Lieutenant Pavlichenko possesses is something more than just beauty. ...She has the face 
7 “Post-Soviet” over the course of this essay will be used to refer to belonging to the states, 
cultures, or peoples of any of the 15 independent countries which resulted from the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union.  
8 Lyudmila Pavlichenko, ​Lady Death: The Memoirs of Stalin’s Sniper​, trans. David Foreman 
(Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2018), 174. 
9 
of a Madonna from a Correggio painting and the hands of a child…”) . As an example from a 9
country as foreign and strange as the Soviet Union, American reporters could see in Pavlichenko 
whatever they wished of her.  
To return to Vasilii Breev’s comments on heroes “the more remote, the more vague, the 
less accessible the hero, the more freedom for the imagination” - Pavlichenko could be, and was, 
anything to the Americans. Yet in her homeland, this was also true, for a woman in uniform was 
just as remote, just as vaguely known, and just as inaccessible as a Soviet citizen was to 
Americans.  
How could this be? For as Russian historian Lyuba Vinogradova writes, “In a country 
that proclaimed 100 per cent [sic] equality of the sexes, it did not seem strange to anyone that an 
extensive mobilisation [sic] of women for the army should take place”.  Women’s combat 10
service is, more than seventy years later, remembered in the successor states of the Soviet Union 
as an indication of these female citizens’ extreme patriotism, the state of total war which 
demanded sacrifices from all sectors, and the success of communism’s mission in the liberation 
of the oppressed gender. Memory, in contrast to the historian’s work, is not always a full 
recollection of impartial facts. The prominence of women combatants in memory is inconsistent 
throughout the decades of the Soviet Union’s existence. Vinogradova’s statement can and should 
be taken as a contemporary echo of​ ​post​-Glasnost ​and post-Soviet mnemonic revisionism; one 
assumed that because the state proclaimed equality and nondiscriminatory practices, that it 
9 Gilbert King, “Eleanor Roosevelt and the Soviet Sniper,” ​Smithsonian Magazine​, February 21, 
2013, 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/eleanor-roosevelt-and-the-soviet-sniper-23585278/​; 
New York Post quoted in Pavlichenko, 189. 
10 Lyuba Vinogradova, ​Avenging Angels: Young Women of the Soviet Union’s WWII Sniper 
Corps​, trans. Arch Tait (MacLehose Press, 2017), 27. 
10 
would exist, but one need only look at Svetlana Alexevich’s extensive interviews of female 
veterans to see that gender egalitarianism was less than a minor concern at the time of war, and 
many female veterans were shamed into hiding or minimizing the roles they played.  In her 11
doctoral dissertation, Adrienne Harris repeatedly demonstrates how many women who served 
were sidelined after their demobilization, and how between the 1960s and 1980s, they struggled 
to have their stories told.   Women in armed combat were, as stated, a new feature to the popular 12
landscape; despite such noteworthy historical characters as Nadezhda Durova , the collective 13
psyche of the Soviet peoples did not have an existing ontological space for these figures. Not 
only was this true in Russian culture, but in the Turkic, Caucasian, and other ethnic groups of the 
Soviet Union, where women were meant to be mothers, daughters, lovers - passive or nurturing 
figures whose existence was incompatible with violence and military culture. 
When we circle back to Pavlichenko and women like her - some of more than the half a 
million female-bodied peoples that served in the Red Army, and the thousands of others that 
were non-official combatants in the four years of the Great Patriotic War - their memory 
becomes a question of depiction. While Pavlichenko was able to write memoirs and tell her own 
version of the war, it was more often that combatants died than returned home from the Eastern 
front. Thus, how did others tell their stories? When the framework of war presupposes a 
masculine presence, and a feminine one upsets that framework, how were women spoken of 
11 Anja Tippner, “Girls in Combat: Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia and the Image of Young Soviet 
Wartime Heroines,” ​The Russian Review​ 73 (July 2014): 371–88, 377. 
12 Adrienne Harris, “The Myth of the Woman Warrior and World War II in Soviet Culture.” 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2008, 228-231.  
13 Nadezhda Andreyevna Durova (1783-1866) was a Russian woman who disguised herself as a 
man in order to join the army in battle against Napoleon’s armies. Her autobiography ​The 
Cavalry Maiden ​(Russian: “Сочинения кавалерист-девицы”) is one of the earliest examples of 
female military memoirs. 
11 
when they lacked the ability to speak for themselves? Were they patriots, liberated by the state 
from bourgeois gender roles, who chose willingly to enter into combat? Or were they Joans of 
Arc - as had been so snidely referenced by an American columnist on Pavlichenko, when she 
asked why the sniper did not take more pride in her appearance and dress in “shining armor”? Or 
were they the “harpies and hyenas” that their most virulent critics leveled against them? 
The questions are important because both blur the lines between symbols and crass 
reality. The ​symbol ​of Joan of Arc helps show “our most self-flattering illusions​” ​despite “the 
ideas they embody [being] questionable, however brave and loyal and true they themselves were 
in pursuit of their aims”.  Reality, as hardly needs to be stated, can serve as a threat if it runs 14
contrary to those self-flattering illusions. At the same time Vinogradova states there was no 
surprise in women’s recruitment and enlistment, the very title of her books on female Soviet 
soldiers - ​Avenging Angels ​and ​Defending the Motherland  ​- put femininity first and foremost in 15
the mind of the reader, and as responsive actors rather than active ones. The further time moves 
away from the Great Patriotic War, the more its female combatants become historical objects 
capable of being instrumentalized and  manipulated. This reveals the answer to the 
aforementioned questions - that female combatants were, as a collective, capable of being 
anything and nothing because of the multiplicity of identities they held. When there was no 
single pre-existing archetype  Lyudmila Pavlichenko could fit in to, then she could be anything 16
14 Marina Warner quoted in Adrienne Harris, “The Lives and Deaths of a Soviet Saint in the 
Post-Soviet Period: The Case of Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia,” ​Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue 
Canadienne Des Slavistes​ 53, no. 2/4 (December 2011): 273–304, 275. 
15 Russian: “Женщины-снайперы Великой Отечественной” and “Защищая Родину. Летчицы 
Великой Отечественной Ангелы мщения” respectively. 
16 ​In her dissertation, Adrienne Harris argues that “women warriors fall into three types based on 
deep  cultural archetypes: the martyr, the handmaiden, and the knight (​polianista​)” yet that these 
archetypes come from folkloric genres such as ​byliny​ or ​skazki​. As such, the women who fought 
12 
and everything depending upon the lens with which one chose to view her. Female combatants - 
a term which is intended to encompass both soldiers and partisans, and exclude civilians and the 
home front - are oftentimes more individually remembered than their male counterparts, who can 
fall under the generic image of a ‘soldier’ in the collective memory and imagination of a war. 
Yet simultaneously, we see them stripped of individual characteristics and given new ones 
reflective of the virtues or politics of a time period. We see them transformed into symbols that 
can remain remarkably consistent between Soviet and post-Soviet mnemonic cultures, 
inexorably linked to the memory of the Great Patriotic War and resilient when faced with 
contemporary re-examinations. Most fascinatingly is that those contemporary re-examinations by 
Russian public officials and personalities are often attempts to ascribe negative human 
characteristics and behavior back onto these individual women. As historical objects, female 
combatants of World War II remain flexible tools in the post-Soviet space. Their ties to the Great 
Patriotic War supersede ethnic and national bounds, and yet this simultaneously makes them 
potent political tools in reshaping national memory in a contentious arena.  
Over the course of this essay, I hope to examine memory and memorialization of the 
female combatants via three different women and how, following the war, they were depicted in 
such media as film, statues, and publications. The goal of this examination is to see what 
conclusions might be drawn at large about how women who produced first hand accounts were 
received versus subsequent memory actors’ depictions of their subjects, and what contexts may 
have influenced changes in these depictions. Attention is paid to how the balance between 
in the twentieth century and with more modern weaponry (ie., aeroplanes and machine gun), 
have difficulty mapping on to either the handmaiden or the knight archetypes. The martyr 
archetype and its role in Soviet female combatants is discussed later in this essay. Harris 2008, 
8-16.  
13 
‘woman’ and ‘soldier’ changes in non-fictional productions. To do so, however, first must be 
laid out the framework with which I approached this study - as a piece in the interdisciplinary 
field of ‘memory studies’, which, like the figure of the female combatant, can encompass 
anything it needs to be. The theoretical groundwork for this thesis, composed of its second 
chapter, is divided in two sections to first distinguish the major bodies of work I drew upon.  
The first section of the second chapter is dedicated to collective memory and memory 
politics relating to the Great Patriotic War - presupposing that the war’s overshadowing legacy 
and importance in the Soviet Union’s history is known. I consider it vital to not only discuss the 
role of the female combatant in Soviet-Russian memory, but in other ethnic groups’, considering 
that it was not only Slavic Russian women who served in the Red Army and fought as partisans. 
In this aspect, I will be discussing ethnic Kazakhs and Kazakhstan insofar as it relates to the 
memorialization and memory of female soldiers. To neglect this interethnic example is to 
continue to push the non-Russian to the periphery, when there were distinct efforts by the 
Communist Party to develop and foster these national identities in addition to a shared, Soviet 
one. Katherine Verdery’s 1999 work on dead bodies and monuments as totems of memory 
politics is a source of heavy inspiration and guidance when it comes to bridging the gap between 
theory and reading of monuments as mnemonic texts.   17
The second section is given to gender and war, which draws heavily upon the works of 
historians Maria Bucur; although primarily a historian of Romania, her contributions to the 
interplay between gender and war and memorialization provide a thorough grounding on the 
17 ​Katherine Verdery, ​The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
14 
topic.  In addition, art historian Elisabeth Bronfen’s seminal work on death, femininity and 18
aesthetic is given attention because of how thorough it articulates the symbolic power of a dead 
woman’s image, which comes into tight focus when I examine the case studies.  This thesis is 19
deeply indebted to Adrienne Harris’ body of work on ‘woman warriors’ and mythmaking in the 
Soviet Union.  As war and, especially, the Great Patriotic War is traumatic because of the sheer 20
scale of death and the images of it which circulated, I feel Bronfen’s lens is relevant as despite its 
different academic field.  
 The third chapter of this work will briefly discuss my methodology and choice of cases 
for this study, which form the bulk of the fourth and final chapter. An explanation and 
description of materials used - primarily newspaper articles, films, memoirs, and biographies - 
for my analysis will be contained within this section. Following this section, I will discuss three 
female combatants - Zoia Kosmodemyanskaya, Lyudmila Pavlichenko, and Manshuk Mametova 
- and how they have been memorialized and remembered in both the Soviet Union and two key 
successor states (the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan). While temporally 
broad, this approach takes into account the potential for voices and perspectives stifled under 
state socialism; when changes are noted and these women’s memories become entangled with 
wider post-independent/post-Soviet issues, it becomes extremely clear how easily the female 
18 ​Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds., ​Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern 
Europe​, Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies (Indiana University 
Press, 2006. Bucur, Maria. ​Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century 
Romania​. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009). 
19 ​Elisabeth Bronfen, ​Over Her Dead Body: Death, Femininity and the Aesthetic ​ (New York: 
Routledge, 1992). 
20 Harris 2008. Harris 2011.  
15 
combatant as a mnemonic object can be altered or invoked based on the needs of the collective 




































Chapter 1: Theoretical Background 
Great Patriotic War and Memory Politics 
  
Before delving into the specific utilization of female combatants vis a vi their 
connections to World War II and specifically the Soviet and post-Soviet memory of the war, it is 
necessary to try and examine memory of the war itself. This is no easy or succinct task, and 
scores of authors and theorists have tried to untangle the Gordian knot that unites the Soviet 
Union, its successor states, and their collective memory of the Great Patriotic War. Therefore it 
is best to step back and define various terms - memory, collective memory, history - and their 
uses. 
The idea of a collective possessing traits that their individual components do not is not a 
modern creation; in the nineteenth century, Gustave Le Bon referred to the “psychological law of 
the mental unity of crowds” - that despite the specific individuals which compose a crowd, 
including backgrounds, character, and intelligence, their presence within a crowd puts them in 
possession of a “collective mind, which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite 
different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state 
of isolation”, akin to the nature of cells in a living body.  Collective memory, as first used by 21
sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, denotes not the gathered result of individuals remembering an 
event, but a reconstruction of an image of the past “which is in accord, in each epoch, with the 
predominant thoughts of the society”.   An event enters into the imagination of both those who 22
21 Gustave Le Bon, ​The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind​ (Mineola, New York: Dover 
Publications, Inc, 2002), 4. 
22 Maurice Halbwachs, ​On Collective Memory​, trans. Lewis A Coser, 1st ed., Heritage of 
Sociology Series (University of Chicago Press, 1992), 40. 
17 
experience it and those who are told about it, like a game of narrative telephone, capable of 
minor alterations or complete revisions based on the abilities and intentions of the reteller. It is 
separate from what Halbwachs refers to as “the preservation of memories by cerebral processes”, 
and additionally requires a study and understanding of the “social framework” in which the 
collective memory is formed and shaped: “no memory is possible outside frameworks used by 
people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections”.  From this initial theorist, 23
historian Adrienne Harris has further defined memory as “representation of the past and the 
making of it into a shared cultural knowledge by successive generations in ‘vehicles of memory’ 
such as books, films, museums, and commemorations, and others” . While memory and history 24
are intimately linked, and often frequently overlapped or misinterpreted as the other, I look to 
Pierre Nora’s differentiation of the two as an example to follow. He writes that: 
Memory is always a palpable phenomenon, a tie experienced in eternal presence. History, 
on the other hand, is a representation of the past. ...Memory sacralizes the past, history 
which is oriented towards disenchantment, desacralizes [sic] it. Memory is owned by a 
group and it is the cement of this group. ...History, on the other hand, belonging to 
everybody and nobody, makes a claim to universality.  25
 
Not all who work with and study commemorative practices agree with the definition or 
use of the term ‘collective memory’. In her extensive body of work on war, gender, and memory 
in Eastern Europe, historian Maria Bucur does not use the concept of ‘collective memory’, 
because, in her view, of “the distinction between product and process”. Remembering is a 
23 Ibid, 39-43. 
24 Alon Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," American 
Historical Review 105.2 (1997) quoted in Harris 2011, 275. 
25 ​Les lieux de mémoire​, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1984-199, 23-43 quoted in Jan Kubik 
and Michael Bernhard, “A Theory of the Politics of Memory,” in ​Twenty Years After 
Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration​ (Oxford University Press, 2014), 
7–34. 
18 
process, and she does not identify any single stable result or product which can be identified as 
“collective memory”. In her view, “political elites in modern states [are] constantly attempting to 
employ narratives and rituals about the past to gain political legitimacy” and identifies these as 
“commemorative discourses”. While these discourses do not “reflect” memories, they are 
“appropriated” by elites “in a social politicized context”.  However, Halbwachs specifically 26
discusses that collective memory is discursive and dynamic, rather than a specific phenomenon 
that can be pointed to and identified at a given moment:  
We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives and these are continually reproduced; 
through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is perpetuated. 
 
But precisely because these memories are repetitions, because they are successively 
engaged in very different systems of notions, at different periods of our lives, they have 
lost the form and the appearance they once had.  27
 
The process and resulting changes are integral to any study of what might be termed 
collective memory. Although there is not a specific source to which one can point and identify as 
the ​collective memory, it can be identified by what specific qualities are repeated and carry on 
through reproduction. Those elements which remain consistent  
 
Memory Politics 
Svetlana Alexevich recounts a specific instance - a marriage formed of both a male and 
female veteran - in the introduction to her ​Unwomanly Face of War​, in which the husband 
specifically instructs his wife to recount the war “the way I taught you. Without tears and 
women’s trifles”. The wife specified further “He studied ​The History of the Great Patriotic War 
26 Maria Bucur, ​Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press2, 2009), 9-10. 
27 Halbwachs, 47. 
19 
[sic] with me all last night. He was afraid for me. And now he’s worried I won’t remember right. 
Not the way I should”.  This moment can be taken as both an example of and metaphor for the 28
core struggle of many women interviewed for Alexevich’s book - the tension between the 
correct, masculine experience of the war, and the women’s potential emotionalized skewing of 
the facts. The former is sanctified in books, and contestation risks punishment; despite whatever 
official record may exist, the wife risked repercussions by veering into tales of hair-braiding and 
beauty. This tension exemplifies the utilization and shaping of collective memory; Halbwachs 
refers to it as the ​reconstruction of the past​, altered by the multiplicity of ways society relates to 
and interferes with the individual personality. Although he suggests that “modern societies 
pretend to respect the individual personality”, such sentiment must be disregarded when 
approaching societies where state institutions were ideologically predisposed to transforming 
their inhabitants into ideal citizens. If culture is one framework which profoundly influences and 
interprets memory, than another equally influential one is conscious deliberate manipulation by 
institutions in their attempt to create a “useable past”.  In Alexevich’s example, the institutions 29
would be represented by those writers of ​The History of the Great Patriotic War​, the censors 
which approved and edited its content, and the party which required its specific narrative to lack 
an emotionalized perspective.  
To instrumentalize these conflicts, political scientists Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard 
created a schema breaking down the framework into two distinct categories, ‘memory actors’ 
versus ‘memory regimes’. The former is further broken down into four typologies - mnemonic 
28 Svetlana Alexievich, ​The Unwomanly Face of War: An Oral History of Women in World War 
II​, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Random House, 2017), xxiv. 
29 Kubik and Bernhard, 19. 
20 
pluralists, warriors, abnegator, and perspectives (see Appendix C for full breakdown) - based on 
the answer to Harold Lasswell’s definition of politics - “​who​ gets ​what​, ​when​, and ​how​” . For 30
instance, Kubik and Bernhard identify a ‘mnemonic warrior’ as one who views themselves - by 
extension, their ethnic group and/or nation-state - in an ‘Us vs Them’ struggle over truth, where 
others with a contradictory or competing memory culture are ‘attacking our ‘history’. A pluralist 
would instead be considered an actor willing to accommodate and allow a competing or 
contrasting interpretation of the past to exist, as “in addition to “us” and our vision of history, 
there are “them” with their own vision of the past”.   31
The second matrix of categorization - memory regimes - is defined by what type of actors 
are present within the cultural mnemonic discourse.  Kubik and Bernhard focus on two key 32
factors in classifying regimes - “(1) an organized way of remembering a specific issue, event, or 
process (2) at a given moment or period”.  These regimes are dynamic and change depending on 33
the specific composition of mnemonic actors in the given context. As an example, “when a 
mnemonic warrior enters a debate on a particular issue, and there is an intention to draw a sharp 
line between “true” versions of the past and “false” version being propagated”, the regime is 
“fractured”, while  a “unified” regime is one that is largely free of mnemonic conflict between 
parties. They note that because of the degree of salience any particular event may have at any 
given point of time, analysis of an overarching “mnemonic field” encompassing a context in 
30 Ibid, 14. 
31 Ibid, 13. 
32 Ibid, 11-22. 
33 Ibid, 16. 
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totality and any conclusions drawn from such examinations should be done only after an 
inductive analysis of memory regimes on their own.   34
Using the wealth of information and analyses done on contemporary Russian memory 
politics, I would argue that the memory of the Great Patriotic War maps cleanly onto what Kubik 
and Bernhard call an “official regime”, which they define as one: “Formulation and propagation 
that involve the intensive participation of state institutions and/or political society (the authorities 
and major political actors such as parties, who are organized to hold and contest state power”.  35
Furthermore, the Russian mnemonic regime surrounding the Great Patriotic War is heavily 
populated by mnemonic warriors, and one should look no further than Vladimir Putin’s speech 
on 18 June, 2020 “attacking” Western countries for failing to learn the “true lessons” of World 
War II for proof of the us vs them mentality in the memory culture.  36
Returning to Kubik and Bernhard’s discussion of individual analyses of memory regimes 
over time, one must examine the Soviet Union’s intensely controlled memory regime before 
trying to parse those of its successor states. Each post-socialist state grapples with its past 
according not only to its individualized circumstances leading into democratization, but the “by 
several unique ​structural (institutional) constraints ​of this sort”.  Again referring to Kubik and 37
34 Ibid, 17-18. 
35 Ibid, 17. 
36 “Putin Publishes Essay on ‘Real Lessons’ of WWII: Russian President Attacks European 
Narrative of WWII, Days before Rescheduled Victory Day Parade.,” The Moscow Times, June 
18, 2020, 
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/18/putin-publishes-essay-on-real-lessons-of-wwii-a7
062​; Vladimir Putin, “Vladimir Putin: The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War 
II,” The National Interest, June 18, 2020, 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vladimir-putin-real-lessons-75th-anniversary-world-war-ii-16
2982?page=0%2C1​. 
37 Kubik and Bernhard, 20-21. 
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Bernhard, we note that the “first, we consider the type of state socialism…[we] focus only on a 
very simple, yet almost unanimously accepted generalization that there were two main types of 
state socialist regimes: ​liberalized ​and ​hard-line ​[sic]. ...The distinction between reformist  and 38
hard-line communist systems has important ramifications for the nature of the extrication from 
communism. The former were much more likely to negotiate with their opponents, whereas the 
latter were more resistant to change, and this difference has powerful repercussions for the 
games of memory politics after the breakthrough” . This explains not merely the differences in, 39
say, Albania’s relationship to its communist past as compared to Soviet successor states’, but 
also how different successor states grapple with their Soviet pasts. For the core of an empire 
always will have marked differences to the experiences of the periphery, and the transitions out 
of communism experienced by newly independent states can have marked similarities to the 
effects on their memory politics as different types of state socialisms. Comparing Estonian 
memory politics to Kazakhstani, for instance, must take into account the forms of government 
that came in after socialism, as they can be compared to the differences between the ‘reformist’ 
and ‘hard-line’ systems Kubik and Bernhard speak of.  
 
The Great Patriotic War and Nation Building in the (Post-)Soviet Consciousness 
When it comes to the most somber aspects of our existence...it seems they are enveloped 
by clouds that half cover them. That faraway world where we remember that we suffered 
nevertheless exercises an incomprehensible attraction on the person who has survived it 
and who seems to think he has left the best part of himself, which he tries to recapture. 
This is why, given a few exceptions, it is the case that the great majority of people more 
or less frequently are given to what one might call nostalgia for the past.  40
38 Kubik and Bernhard use the terms ​liberalized ​and ​reformist ​interchangeably with regard to 
how to differentiate types of communist/socialist regimes. 
39 Ibid, 20-21. 
40 Halbwachs, 48-49. 
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To say in any way how the Great Patriotic War is referred to as the Soviet Union’s most 
successful victory and biggest defeat is still an understatement. The above quote comes from 
Maurice Halbwachs and perhaps goes some way to explaining why the war looms largest of any 
event in the country’s memory - more so than the revolution which founded it, and the moment 
which dissolved it. The sheer scale of Soviet losses  and the multiplicity of the war experience - 41
occupation, bombardment, mobilization, and displacement - has  
Within the task of analyzing the connections between memory of the war and political 
democratization, writes Thomas Wolfe, “the Soviet case appears stubbornly anomalous” . For 42
much of the Soviet Union’s existence, its citizens lacked a public sphere where could be engaged 
the presence and absence of historical interpretation; it lacked war trials or seminal works similar 
to ​Le Syndrome de Vichy ​where the average citizen could read and debate ideas with their own 
family or learned experiences of the war years. Even now, nearing thirty years since the official 
death of the Soviet Union, there remains the strange predicament of engagement with the Soviet 
past. Adrienne Harris points to the long-term effect of an official regime on the collective’s 
memory: “The Russian case is a special one: the nation’s collective memory, strongly controlled 
from above, evolved during the first seven decades of the Soviet period only to splinter during 
the ​perestroika ​[sic] years and the post-Soviet period. During the post-Soviet period, the shared 
and uncontested, at least officially, cohesive collective memory Russians had inherited from the 
pre-glasnost​ [sic] Soviet period reluctantly gave up ground”.  However, it should be noted that 43
41 ​See Footnote 5 for casualty counts. 
42 Thomas C Wolfe, “Past as Present, Myth, or History? Discourses of Time and the Great 
Fatherland War,” in ​The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe​ (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 249–83, 249. 
43 Harris 2011, 276. 
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Harris wrote the above in 2011, and subsequent years have come to see a strengthening of the 
Soviet-style mnemonic regime on the topic of the Second World War, and the Russian 
Federation’s refusal to allow for challenges to that narrative even at the expense of relations with 
the European Union.  While far from true across all nations which emerged from the Soviet 44
Union, examples in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan show there can be a strong bottom-up nostalgia 
for both the Soviet state apparati and culture, leading to varying salience among populations 
when Soviet memory is invoked by state actors.  45
To again quote Thomas Wolfe - “post Soviet Russia has not seen this kind of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung ...that has been a vital issue in other European states”, and thus it is 46
to little surprise that the official mnemonic regime would be inherited almost whole cloth from 
the Soviet Union. Russia has lacked any of the “complex negotiations over memory between 
political parties and their corresponding social and cultural constituencies, corporate and state 
media, generational cohorts” - and even any agreement on ​which ​events should be the topic of 
such negotiations and self-reflection.  Lacking a singular event comparable to the Holocaust in 47
Germany or the Atlantic slave trade in the United States that debates about the nature of guilt and 
victimhood can be centralized, too many elements of the Soviet statehood can be pulled in to 
“collective therapeutic project”, as Wolfe calls it. Plucking at these strings risks dismantling the 
44 Putin, “Vladimir Putin: The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II”. 
45 ​Dimitry Solovyov, “Soviet Nostalgia Binds Divergent CIS States,” ​Reuters ​, December 8, 
2011, sec. World News, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cis/soviet-nostalgia-binds-divergent-cis-states-idUSTRE7B71
3O20111208​. 
46 German: “working through the past”. More narrowly defined in the Duden lexicon as “​public 
debate within a country on a problematic period of its recent history”.​ "Duden | 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung | Rechtschreibung, Bedeutung, Definition". 
https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung. 
47 Wolfe, 250-251. 
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Federation’s understanding of its whole history; arguably, it has been better for Vladimir Putin’s 
presidency to support these ideas rather than subject Russians to more catastrophic changes in 
their worldview and place in the mnemonic cosmos. For any analysis can be taken as criticism - 
thus, an attack - on the Soviet Army, and both liberals and nationalists take umbrage to the 
‘cynical insult’ to those who sacrificed themselves for patriotism and the protection of their 
home.  This is not merely a top-down enforcing of the memory regime, for there is a great 48
appeal among the population for exaltation of the war era. As phrased succinctly by journalist 
Natalia Antonova:  
In this sense, coming together to remember World War II is a grand, public-bonding 
ritual for an atomized society in which people have a hard time trusting each other (once 
again, the legacy of Stalin’s Terror is a major factor in this atomization). It’s not so much 
about triumph in a terrifying conflict anymore as it is about tradition, a way of expressing 
pride, even if it be a twisted “Russia has enemies everywhere and will stomp on them if 
necessary” kind of pride.   49
 
In the Central Asian states formed from the Soviet republics, where little if any land was 
subject to invasion, the war still stands as a “seismic event” - one which saw the solidification of 
Soviet rule over its periphery and gave its citizens an opportunity to prove themselves as “full 
citizens”, as Soviet as they were Uzbek or Kazakh.  Former Kazakhstani president Nursultan 50
Nazarbayev referred to the Great Patriotic War as a moment where the people - ​all​ people in 
their multiethnic territory - came together, unified, and proved their strength. While historian 
48 Dina Khapaeva, "History without Memory: Gothic Morality in Post-Soviet Society," 
http://www.eurozine. com/articles/2009-02-02-khapaeva-en.html (last accessed February 26, 
2014), quoted Tippner, 387-388. 
49 Natalia Antonova, “Russia’s Role in WWII Isn’t ‘Part of Our Collective Memory’” (The 
World, May 9, 2019), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-05-09/russia-s-role-wwii-isn-t-part-our-collective-memory​. 
50 Roberto J Carmack, ​Kazakhstan in World War II: Mobilization and Ethnicity in the Soviet 
Empire​ (University Press of Kansas, 2019), 2. 
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Roberto J. Carmack argues in his overarching work on the history of Kazakhstan and World War 
II that “the war’s true impact lies between two extremes of disintegration and unification”, he 
nevertheless contends that “many of the memories and identities associated with the conflict 
have outlasted the Soviet Union itself”.  Additionally, Timur Dadabaev points to how in Central 51
Asia, there is a “long tradition of history construction...where political pressures and official 
ideology always had a decisive say in how that history was interpreted and eventually 
constructed”. There has been two discourses, at times oth separated and overlapping, in 
officialized construction - nationalistic and Soviet - which result in “two different poles” 
intended to develop both a sense of patriotism to the supranational entity and devotion to the 
ethnic nation which the peoples belonged to.  52
On this question of national memories of a similar event, we again look to Kubik and 
Bernhard on the topic: 
There is no “national character” or “collective consciousness” somehow encoded in the 
population’s genes or mysteriously handed over from one generation to another. There 
exist, however, several official systems of social communication and education that 
deliberately manufacture and disseminate sets of “official” narratives about the national 
past and equally powerful sets of “unofficial” narratives generated and reproduced within 
personal networks, which may be at odds or only partially congruent with official 
narratives.  53
 
When looking post-Soviet, these official and unofficial narratives do take on especially 
nationalized tensions. Despite the assertion that there is no “national character” encoded in a 
population’s genes, there is repeatedly a political insistence that such a character does exist. It is 
something that appears required as part of the process of justification for why a nation should be 
51 Carmack 2019, 158.  
52 Dadabaev, 26-31. 
53 Kubik and Bernhard, 22. 
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independent. “Nations are not something eternal. ...They had their beginnings and they will end”. 
They are founded on a legacy of memories - to Dominique Schnapper, “for individuals and 
peoples alike, memory is the predicate of self.  54
The tension in Kazakhstani historical research lies between those who adhered to their 
scholarly training, generally along the Soviet model, and those who engage in “mythologizing 
history”, which has found appeal among the newly independent republic.  Furthermore, these 55
mythological - sometimes interchangeable with “alternate” or “suppressed” - histories are also 
argued to be in line with the tribal structure of Kazakh society, with its emphasis on kinship ties. 
As representations of honorable historical figures enter prominently into contemporary 
Kazakhstani life - as statues, state and city-wide celebrations, and national holidays - these 
newly-prominent histories join together with the ambitions of contemporary tribal elites to form 
a different type of memory politics than that seen in the Russian Federation.  On the topic of the 56
Great Patriotic War, placing Kazakhstan into Kubik and Bernhard’s model is complicated; 
President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev confirmed that his state would not tolerate the “falsification 
of history” which would “diminish” the role of the USSR in Germany’s defeat, but the field is 
absent of the type of debates and fury which dominate discussion of the war in Ukraine or even 
neighboring Uzbekistan.  In contrast, however, to Russia and the European portions of the 57
54 David Rieff, ​In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies​ (Yale University 
Press, 2016), 29. 
55 Anuar Galiev, “Mythologization of History and the Invention of Tradition in Kazakhstan,” 
Oriente Moderno​, Nuova Serie, 96, no. 1 (2016): 46–63, 47 
56 Galiev, 49-50 
57 “President Tokaev Committed to Memory of World War II, Won’t Tolerate USSR Role 
Revisionism,” ​The Astana Times​, May 5, 2020, sec. International, 
https://astanatimes.com/2020/05/president-tokaev-committed-to-memory-of-world-war-ii-wont-t
olerate-ussr-revisionism/​; “In Rememberance of the World War II,” QAZAQSTAN TARIHY, 
May 11, 2018,​ ​https://e-history.kz/en/news/show/7136/​. 
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Soviet Union, where World War II was the great national tragedy which touched every family, 
the largest events which spur debate in Kazakhstani memory of the Soviet past is collectivization 
and the Gulag’s role in changing the traditional Kazakh way of life. Even above that is the 
question on the legacy of Soviet nationalism policies - as historian Martha Olcott phrases it, “was 
[the USSR] just a new vehicle of Russian imperialism albeit with a transformed ideology, or was 
it an ideologically driven multinational state in which the majority nationality largely controlled 
the political, economic and social agendas.”   58
As it relates to the Second World War, Kazakhstani mnemonic regimes would suggest 
that there is a fondness for the latter interpretation of the Soviet Union; the war was a time when 
peoples regardless of their origins were able to come together in an ideological battle, 
communism versus fascism. Quoting ​Bauyrzhan Momyshuly, a Kazakh recipient of the Hero of 
the Soviet Union and the People’s Hero of Kazakhstan, a 2019 Kazakhstani article prints: 
... They were different in age and nationality. But the demand was the same from 
everyone, everyone was equal before the oath given to the Motherland - whether you are 
Kazakh or Russian, Moldovan or Georgian. More experienced, experienced fighters 
taught young soldiers wisdom, ingenuity, shared everything in a brotherly way: tobacco, 
crackers, the last sip of water ... Together they mourned the dead, rejoiced together in 
victory, and went into battle together, shoulder to shoulder.   59
 
This has persisted since independence; a recent example of this historical interpretation 
can be found in President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s remarks surrounding a new law which 
would award 1 million tenge  to surviving veterans for the 75th anniversary of the war. He 60
58 Martha Brill Olcott, “Kazakhstan’s Soviet Legacy,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, November 20, 2011, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/30/kazakhstan-s-soviet-legacy-pub-46096​. 
59 “С Днем Победы! О Казахстанских Героях.,” Orient Solutions, May 8, 2019, 
http://ors.kz/company/news/2016/​. 
60 Approximately 2,400 USD. 
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stated, “We remember all the war heroes who forever remain lying on the battlefields, who 
sacrificed everything so that we could have a peaceful life”.  Cultural projects following in the 61
model of Russia’s have proliferated in Kazakhstan over the last five to ten years, seeing the 
gathering of documents, eyewitness accounts, and individual memories for preservation of the 
war to pass along to the next generation. Beyond the desire for objective historical archivism, 
many of these projects see direct involvement by the Kazakhstani state.  As more access to 62
archives and material are being allowed to foreign scholars and researchers, it remains to be seen 
what potential challenges to the official mnemonic regime will be allowed. Complications are 
further stressed by tensions with neighboring states over the Soviet past when there are distinct 
elements of society simultaneously calling collectivization a ‘genocide’ and praising the benefits 
of industrialization on Central Asian SSRs’ economies. Partial evidence can be found in 
statements such as these, found peppered through Kazakhstani state news articles - "Recently, 
other symbols of the military glory of the Soviet Union were dismantled in Uzbekistan. The 
rewriting of history in Uzbekistan affected the ways the war is perceived and Soviet memory is 
neglected. In Kazakhstan, on the contrary, Soviet symbols of the World War II are stored and 
even multiplied."  There is hesitation in Kazakhstan around renouncing their Soviet past, which 63
is how actions such as statue removal in Uzbekistan have been perceived. Geopolitical ties to 
Russia further push Kazakhstan into alignment with Putin’s Russia, which comes with accepting 
its memory regime of the Great Patriotic War. We can say that while memory of the Soviet past 
61 Shayakhemetova, “President Tokayev Exclusive Interview: Kazakhstan Must Lead Effort To 
Improve Relations With Neighbors.” 
62 “Больше Памяти о Большой Победе Благодаря Инновациям,” May 19, 2020, sec. 
Аналитика и комментарии,​ ​https://e-cis.info/news/566/86959/​. 
63 “In Rememberance of the World War II.” 
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writ large is “fractured”, in the Great Patriotic War’s memory in Kazakhstan there is an official 
regime which reflects Russia’s.  When this lens is turned on to the case of Mamshuk Mametova, 
as compared to her Russian contemporaries’ treatment post-Soviet Union, the impact of Soviet 
nostalgia and consideration to the Russian mnemonic regime will be  
 
 
Statues as Bodily Memory 
 
Returning to Maria Bucur’s difficulty with the use of the term collective memory, her 
main point of contention is the lack of a ‘product’ which is stable and quasi-tangible. In terms of 
analysis, then, it becomes useful to identify specific objects around which debates and arguments 
can be centered. Even more specifically, one can look at specific types of cultural products as 
manifestations of collective memory insofar that at the time they were produced, they were 
meant to embody a person, object or idea, and convey that to a wider audience. Commemorative 
statues, for instance, have become flashpoints around which memory politics are debated, as they 
were items ideologically designed to concentrate state power and its spatial and temporal order, 
and for the sheer amount of specifically Soviet-style monuments  that were produced.  64
Statues represent a unique overlapping of both generalized symbolism and specific, 
individualized memory; they represent the visage of a specific person while simultaneously 
existing as the body of said person. “By arresting the process of that person’s bodily decay, a 
statue alters the temporality associated with the person”, writes Verdery, “bringing him into the 
realm of the timeless or the sacred”. Likewise, removing a statue achieves the same effect as 
removing an icon from a church - not only is it removed from an audience, it is stripped of its 
64 Katherine Verdery refers to these qualities that distinguish Soviet statues from statues in other 
places - “their gigantism and in the ​kind ​[sic] of time they froze”. . 
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protection by the authority which had erected it in the first place. Thus, one of the first markers 
of communism’s end in Europe was the removal of statues previously, and simultaneously, 
representing the state, its leaders, and its protection of a codified, permanent memory.  65
In the former socialist bloc, there are specific considerations when applied to analyses of 
dead-body politics, as Verdery calls it. “The shift to new democratic politics, the development of 
markets and the restitution of private property, the enlivening of religious worship, the creation 
and territorial bounding of new states” . Verdery also acknowledges the objection of putting 66
statues - constructed, artificial, and artistic as they are - in the same category as the corpses and 
bones of the person. A statue of Lenin removed in Astana does not have the same mnemonic 
effect as removing his embalmed body from Red Square, for instance. However, her argument is 
that the line can be thin, and the spectacle of removal produces an emotional response akin to 
witnessing a corpse, evidenced by mourning or funerary practices performed on the spot. “In 
Yerevan, Armenia...those who took down Lenin’s statue placed it on a truck and drove it as they 
might the body of a deceased person, round and round the central square as if in an open coffin”.
 67
To briefly reference Julia Kristeva’s argument that a corpse is neither a subject nor an 
object, it thus lacks any ability to serve in any way as an agent; the corpse of Lenin both stands 
for Lenin himself and the myriad of qualities ascribed to Lenin, and is wholly incapable of 
supporting or refuting any of them. Verdery emphasizes this as well, writing that, “the 
multiplicity of available meanings makes something (such as a dead body) a good political 
65 Verdery, 5. 
66 Verdery, 3. 
67 Ibid, 12. 
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symbol, effective in moments of system transformation”.  By transitive logic, if dead bodies and 68
statues can come to symbolize one another, then both corpses and statues can be ascribed with 
any number of meanings as well as stand for ideologies on their own. Once this is understood, it 
is clear to see why and how statues become major flashpoints for arguments in memory politics. 
When these considerations meet with discoures surrounding the depiction of women’s bodies 
within political art, the need to analyze closely statues and memorials of female combatants 
appears in order to expose the intersections between gender, memory, and state priority. 
 
Gender and War | Women Combatants in WW2  
 
In the flux of the war period, when gender roles were being re-stabilized and national 
identity (re-)confirmed, the figure of the female combatant presented an unusual conflagration of 
identities to be utilized in a variety of ways by the state - as connections to older historical 
traditions, examples of the exceptionalism of the new Soviet/Socialist human, or tragic victims 
of fasco-capitalist brutality. Now that we have been able to review the concept of collective 
memory and the specific frameworks that the female combatant has been reconstructed in, it 
becomes necessary to look at the intersection of women and war as it relates to the Soviet aspect 
of World War II. Or as Maria Bucur and Nancy Wingfield would state - “to render women 
visible”.  69
In the introduction to a collection of essays on gender and war, Bucur and Wingfield 
argue that their intentions are not to ‘gender’ history - to write women into a narrative that did 
68 Ibid, 125. 
69 Bucur and Wingfield, 4. 
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not originally include them - but to bring to light areas where women’s contributions and roles 
had been minimalized. “What historians have constructed as universal is, in fact, masculine. 
Making women visible underscores this point. Nowhere is this clearer than in the construction of 
wartime heroism. Expanding upon our feminist predecessors from the 1970s, whose aim was to 
shed light on an “authentic” [sic] female experience, we seek to demonstrate how this experience 
has been culturally constructed and is therefore contingent upon a specific context” . Rather 70
than cloistering women’s deeds into the specific subcategories of ‘women’s history’ or ‘gender 
studies’, Bucur and Wingfield’s motivation is to draw attention to the artificial binary created 
between ‘history’ and ‘women’s history’ and, in doing so, deconstruct it.  This approach includes 
examining in detail those cases in which history and memory have already rendered women 
visible - or indeed elevated, as could be argued, to a level above that of their male 
contemporaries. As the adage goes, the exception proves the rule, and by examining those 
exceptions we can better understand what qualities or instances in the abnormal feminine align 
with masculine ideals and/or norms.  
As Wingfield and Bucur continue - “as [women] moved beyond the auxiliary roles...they 
defied the masculine norms that identified heroism and courage with men. ...Fellow soldiers, 
civilian politicians, mothers, and wives at home could only make sense of their heroic actions as 
manly (read: unfeminine) and out of the ordinary (read: abnormal).”  71
As has been demonstrated, the act of recruiting women into the Red Army was both 
political and symbolic - a decision intended to humiliate men and provoke them into becoming 
brave and patriotic soldiers. Wingfield and Bucur highlight “[male] veterans turned participation 
70 Ibid, 4. 
71 Ibid, 7. 
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in combat into an important element for separating “true men” [sic] from the rest, thus upending 
traditional masculine class and educational hierarchies” . This assertion is repeated by a number 72
of different scholars in, perhaps oxymoronically, explaining what happened when women were 
brought into combat and the Red Army. British historian Catherine Merridale discusses the 
intentions behind the initiative, which in her words had less to do with gender equality than 
calculated use of gender disparity; 
The most conspicuous innovation [of the Red Army], which began in earnest in the 
summer of 1942, was the recruitment of young women. In the first weeks of the war 
women had been discouraged from applying for active service roles. But a labor shortage 
everywhere, at the front line and in the factories, changed everything. That summer, the 
military expressed itself keen to recruit “healthy young girls”.  
 
To some extent the idea was to shame the men into greater effort. The other goal was to 
make civilian women more effective, to shame them, too, into working long hours in 
armaments plants or on the farms. ...Unlike the men, they found it hard to fit their bodies 
into the heroic mold, to see themselves as warriors. There had been women at the front in 
Russia’s other wars, but never on this scale.  73
 
Anna Krylova in her extensive body of work on female soldiers posits a different thesis: 
that women who fought and participated in combat during the Second World War in the Soviet 
Union did so not because of necessity, in order to ‘free a man to fight’, but because by 1941 they 
were part of a generation that had been raised within an ideological system which saw male and 
female genders as differentiated but non-oppositional when it came to traditionally masculine 
work, such as military service.  Drawing on work from both veterans' memoirs and propaganda, 74
Krylova writes that: 
72 Ibid, 7. 
73 Catherine Merridale, ​Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945​ (Picador, 2006), 
165. 
74 Krylova quoted in Adrienne M. Harris, “Yulia Drunina: The ‘Blond-Braided Soldier’ on the 
Poetic Front,” ​The Slavic and East European Journal​ 54, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 643–65, 646. 
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In their universe, the woman soldier [sic] choice of self-identification did not constitute a 
contradiction in terms because the very notions of womanhood and soldierhood did not 
stand in self-evident, intuitive disagreement with each other. By no means were female 
volunteers, combatants, and veterans, at any point, oblivious to conventional - that is, 
opposition-generated - gender ideals of appropriate male and female wartime behavior.  75
 
Women were not forced to decide between the role of patriot or of woman - as the culture 
from the Revolution through Stalinism allowed for an overlap of identities in this sphere. In 
Krylova’s finding, it did not masculinize the woman to serve the state in an active combative 
role. In the same way the Soviet Union fostered both Soviet and ethnic identities in their 
non-Russian subjects, so too did early to Stalinist USSR permit one to have their gender and 
serve the state. Krylova is challenged by the post-war treatment of women. Svetlana Alexevich 
provided a number of first hand accounts showing that this non-oppositional gender dynamic 
was far from universally accepted even by the one/two generations it supposedly influenced. 
Revolution-era parents of “professionally violent women” castigated their daughters upon their 
return home from the front, showing that transgression from women’s prescribed criteria resulted 
in rejection and alienation.   76
Krylova and Merridale, however, do not stand in direct contrast to each other but rather 
present two different subjects with competing motivations that led to a brief moment where 
traditional gender divide between soldier/male and homefront/female were weaker. Krylova 
speaks to the motivation of the women who went to combat, while Merridale discusses the 
viewpoint of the state which loosened restrictions on female service. In the absence of an 
existing paradigm to which a female soldier could fit, and the inability to manufacture one 
75 Krylova 2010, 13-14 quoted in Ibid, 646. 
76 Alexievich. 
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rapidly in the culture of a total war, we must look at older conceptions of women, war, and death 
in order to understand how they could be conceptualized.  
 
The aesthetics and power of dead women 
A man dying in war is both a harsh reality and a glorious sacrifice - the individual subject 
willingly and nobly subsuming himself into the grinder of battle - while the woman should never 
have found herself in the situation. This dichotomy is pervasive throughout historiographies of 
warfare.  If Axis - and even Allied - observers viewed the presence of Soviet women in combat 77
as proof of communism’s upending of this historical norm, then likewise the Soviet Union 
viewed their women going to battle as evidence of the desperate tragedy of it all. Though writing 
on the Spanish Civil War, Brian Bunk points to the images and memory of ‘political martyrs’, 
several of whom were women. “The sacrifices and horrors endured by revolutionary martyrs 
served as both example and indictment for future political and military actions. The success of 
martyr imagery in generating assistance helped mobilize divisive social groups...”  Political 78
parties hoped citizens would unite around the “inspirational memory”, stirred by the “outrage 
and horror arising from the graphic depictions of suffering”.  “In part these efforts [employing 79
traditional gender roles to mobilize political support in the aftermath of the 1934 October 
revolution in Spain] represented the mirror image of commemorations designed to stabilize 
77 ​Markwick, Roger D., and Euridice Charon Cardona. ​Soviet Women on the Frontline In the 
Second World War​. Hampshire: Palgravee Macmillian, 2012.​, 2.  
78 Brian D. Bunk, ​Ghosts of Passion: Martyrdom, Gender, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil 
War​ (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007), 62. 
79 Ibid, 74. 
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masculine roles by requiring women to fulfill their passive responsibilities as witnesses, victims, 
and rewards”.   80
To that we can turn to Elizabeth Bronfen, whose seminal study of death, femininity, and 
aesthetics, draws attention to the power and pathology depictions of the female corpse have upon 
spectators. At the core of Bronfen’s examination of the feminine corpse and its depiction in art 
and culture is her thesis:  
Narrative and visual representations of death, drawing their material from a common 
cultural image repertoire, can be read as symptoms of our culture. Furthermore, because 
the feminine body is culturally constructed as the superlative site of alterity, culture uses 
art to dream the deaths of beautiful women. Over representations of the dead feminine 
body, culture can repress and articulate its unconscious knowledge of death which it fails 
to foreclose even as it cannot express it directly. If symptoms are failed repressions, 
representations are the symptoms that visualise even as they conceal what is too 
dangerous to articulate openly but too fascinating to repress successfully. They repress by 
localising death away from the self, at the body of a beautiful woman, at the same time 
that this representation lets the repressed return, albeit in a disguised manner.  81
 
The aestheticization of the female corpse is one seeped in European and gothic tradition - 
which, despite its pointed separation from bourgeois art, the Soviet Union still shares an artistic 
heritage with. Indeed, Victoria Bonnell discusses how even the first images of women in art after 
the Bolshevik Revolution followed in neoclassical tradition, specifically the French; Bolsheviks 
turned an aesthetic eye towards the Jacobin revolution for connections to the historical narrative 
of libraration against elites.  Though later changes to political art and propaganda reflected a 82
state desire to make visual media more accessible across social classes, this continuity among 
allegorical symbols is vital in interpreting depictions of dead female combatants. On a society 
80 Ibid, 121. 
81 Bronfen, xi. 
82 Victoria E. Bonnell, “The Representation of Women in Early Soviet Political Art,” ​The 
Russian Review​ 50, no. 3 (July 1991): 267–88, 270. 
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which had cultivated associations of ‘freedom’, ‘truth’ and ‘Motherland’ (‘​svaboda’, ‘pravda’ 
and ‘​rodina​’ all feminine words, and common allegories depicted as woman from early 
Bolshevik art onward) to a girl with long flowing hair and a dress, to see these figures echoed in 
war dead likely evoked strong emotions. Or they could be used to do so, if utilized correctly in 
propaganda.  
Returning to Bronfen, she discusses an argument that she had with a fellow art historian 
over the questions of whether depicting death is in-itself a violence revisited upon the artistic 
subject. Rene Girad is quoted as stating “[death is] the worst violence that the human being is 
subjected to” in and of itself, the violence of transformation from subject to object. Bronfen’s 
opponent posits that representations of dying - the act, rather than the result - are not violent, 
“because [the representation]...implies the safe position of a spectator (‘voyeur’) and because a 
fragmentation and idolisation of the body - i.e. a severing of the body from its real materiality 
and its historical context (“fetishism [sic])  - is always built into such images”). Yet in contrast, 
Bronfen argues that the depictions force a spectator into the crossroads between an “aesthetic and 
empathetic response” - forced to choose between treating the depicted body as the material it 
references, or as mere representation to be viewed with distance? Are we meant to mourn the 
woman as though we are placed at her physical deathbed, or are we meant to view a painting as a 
collection of symbols, subjects, and pigments? Or are we, as spectators, meant to do both?  83
It is thus not irrelevant to discussion of the power the image of a dead woman conveys 
when turning the lens to the Soviet Union. Bronfen writes, “The feminine body appears as a 
perfect, immaculate aesthetic form because it is a dead body, solidified into an object of art. The 
83 Bronfen, 44-45. 
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aesthetically pleasing unity this corpse seems to afford draws added power from the fact that we 
know it is about to be cut into” . Again, the subject-object confusion is addressed, and a 84
woman’s corpse transitions from an active agent into a piece that can be ascribed with meaning 
and temporal uncertainty. In a state of abjection, a corpse is uncanny - recognizable by kin and 
yet not - and a woman’s corpse doubly so, for she ought to be desirable as a woman and yet is 
repulsive as a symbol of mortality.  If the female combatant in her boundary-blurring creates 85
ontological confusion, then the corpse of a female combatant can be seen as the horror which 
threatens worldviews and one’s understanding of themself. To quote Kristeva, “The corpse, seen 
without God and outside of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. It 
is something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as 
from an object. Imaginary uncanniness and real threat, it beckons to us and ends up engulfing 
us”.   86
Notably still, Julia Kristeva brings in the possibility of sublimation in the face of 
abjection. In terms of warfare, women, and death, the corpse can come to represent ideals more 
heavenly and ideal. Again, looking to Bunk’s analysis of women participants in the Spanish Civil 
War, “the revolutionaries used the youth and purity of female participants to demonstrate the 
moral and ideological superiority of their cause. ...Pro-revolutionary groups used images of 
motherhood and virginity…[which] portrayed the motivations of the insurrection and those who 
participated in it as morally pure, while those against the revolt became evil beings determined to 
84 Although in this quote Bronfen specifically refers to the painting ​Der Anatom ​by Gabriel von 
Max, the ‘cutting into’ can be taken as metaphor for all postmortem damage done by either 
autopsy or decomposition. Ibid, 5. 
85 Julia Kristeva, ​Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection​, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), 1-6. 
86 Ibid, 4. 
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destroy all who opposed them, including women”. Taken this way, a woman who dies and 
produces a corpse possesses the ability to link heaven to earth, the immortal to the moral, and the 
cause which produced her death indicative of Lacanian ​jouissance.​ The pain of death had been 
worth experiencing because of the pleasure felt by embodying an ideological life. Likewise, the 
conservative/right-wing response demonstrated they viewed these female participants as proof of 
their enemy’s malevolence, who through their corruptive force caused women to turn away from 
motherhood and caregiving and become ‘harpies and hyenas’.  The highly polarized ideologies 87
of the Great Patriotic War made defense of one’s country a statement of political allegiance, and 
identification as a soldier in that fight became both code and shorthand for the ideology itself. 
 
Women, War Propaganda, and Beyond 
Lisa Kirschenbaum points to the construction of Leningrad as a female entity - a body 
ravaged by Nazi aggression, filled with women and children and thus needing defense by the 
male frontline. She argues that this was the state’s representation of the city during the time of 
the siege, which is complicated by the representation put forth by the state that Leningraders 
were “soldiers in civies”.  This construction is a useful metaphor for showing how the Great 88
Patriotic War blurred ontological separation between what were thought to be understood and 
unshakeable differences - the homefront and the frontline, the masculine and the feminine. 
Indeed Wingfield and Bucur write that these were equated with one another  - while these 
definitions have been helpful insofar as they represented averaged experiences and ascribed 
87 Bunk, 120-121. 
88 Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, “‘The Alienated Body’: Gender Identity and the Memory of the Siege 
of Leningrad,” in ​Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe​ (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 220–34, 225. 
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gender norms and ideological expectations of the time, editors Wingfield and Bucur 
acknowledge that a need to problematize these divisions exist.  Kirschenbaum points out, 89
gender differentiations blurred when, during the siege of Leningrad, the traditional ‘women’s 
work’ of finding food and tending to the family became the task of any able-bodied survivor in 
the city, and that the corporality of starvation - the creation of an ‘alienated body’ - stripped 
people of the physical differentiations between man and woman.   90
The women who entered into combat and the army also cast aside their femininity, and 
ceased to be ‘true women’. A core takeaway from Svetlana Alexevich’s seminal book ​The 
Unwomanly Face of War ​is that transformation which occurred among scores of Soviet female 
veterans who, upon returning home from war, were deemed unsuitable for marriage and had 
disgraced their family. Furthermore, it was not simply Russian or Slavic or Soviet gender norms 
that turned female combatants into non-women, for similar sentiments can be ascribed to the 
female combatants throughout the twentieth century from Ireland to Greece.  Thus, after the 91
war, there was a necessity to re-establish these differences as part of the process of returning to 
‘normalcy’ - showing that state socialism could transition from total war to functional peacetime. 
The Soviet Union responded to the supposed destruction of the gender binary  by returning to 92
89 Wingfield and Bucur, 4. 
90 Kirschenbaum, 220. 
91 Bunk; Margaret Poulos Anagnostopoulou, “From Heroines to Hyenas: Women Partisans 
during the Greek Civil War,” ​Contemporary European History​ 10, no. 3 Theme Issue: Gender 
and War in Europe c. 1918-1949 (November 2001): 481–501.. 
92 Both Maria Bucur and Roger Markwick draw reference to the ‘double helix’ thesis of 
disruption and restoration of gender hierarchies put forth by Margaret and Patrice Higonnet. 
Quoting Markwick: “Wartime...in which male warriors monopolize combat while women are 
relegated to the home front…[is] a metaphorical ‘double helix,in which the entwined strands of 
constructed manhood and womanhood revolve around each other, allowing women momentarily 
to displace men in industry but with the male strand of combat always prevailing”. M. R 
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images of women as mothers, not as soldiers or victims; “In July 1944, the Soviet Union began 
its campaign to create iconic mothers, striking medals for the women who had given birth to 
large broods of healthy, surviving young. The ideal woman...was stern and provident, tough as a 
tank driver, the nurse and teacher of armies to come”.   93
Catherine Merridale connects this initiative directly to the anger felt by men deployed, 
who suffered from resentment as letters from home told them of families collapsing, rapes and 
deaths and affairs, and took their anger at the destruction of their homelives out on women 
removed from their place. Merridale suggests that state initiatives on re-emphasizing motherhood 
and traditional Russian femininity were a pacifier to the ire of soldiers who felt that their 
sacrifice was not being rewarded with loyalty and a home, complete with housewife, to return to.
 Quoting anthropologist Sharon MacDonald, Adrienne Harris explains that post-war Russia 94
coped with the collective of women warriors in one of two ways - either by stressing their 
femininity and womanliness at the expense of her warrior qualities, or showing her as 
“unnatural”, something not completely female.  Furthermore, as per historian Anna Froula, 95
“National narratives of masculinist war movies and stories rely on the erasure of women in order 
to identify ‘soldier’ as synonymous with ‘male’. Counter-narrating the gendered history of the 
military with its hypermasculine myths, training, folklore, and culture - especially with stories of 
women’s service - threatens the institution's role as an exclusively male rite of passage”.  In 96
Higonnet et al., eds., ​Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars ​(New Haven) quoted in 
Markwick 2012, 2.  
93 Merridale, 316. 
94 Ibid, 316-317. 
95 Wendy MacDonald quoted in Harris 2010, 648. 
96 Anna Froula, “Free a Man to Fight: The Figure of the Female Soldier in World War II Popular 
Culture,” ​Journal of War & Culture Studies​ 2, no. 2 (2009): 153–65, 154. 
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discussing the figure of the female soldier in American popular culture during World War II, 
Froula suggests that overtly feminizing women in uniform was to quash fears that a woman 
could become too ‘mannish’ - deviant and homosexual.  Therefore - “Wartime narratives that 97
portrayed women at once as vital to the war effort and as indestructibly feminine and 
inextricably tied to the world of family and children drew on and substantially modified earlier 
representations of women in Soviet political art”.  98
To conclude and transition into more concrete analysis of the three chosen case studies, 
one final quote from an historian will sum up the oxymoronic dichotomy that can be considered 
the core of the power in a combative woman’s image: “[the] weak, vulnerable woman fighting 
can be peculiarly powerful, harnessing the struggle of good against evil and the weak against the 
powerful, to the struggle of the nation against its enemies’.”  Exemplified in ​The Motherland 99
Calls, ​the statue which stands in memory of the battle of Stalingrad, is both mother and warrior, 
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98 Kirschenbaum, 221. 
99 Wendy Bracewell, “Problems of Gender and Nationalism”, ms., 1992, quoted in Barbara 
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Three individual women have been chosen to compare and contrast as case studies on the 
memory of female combatants within Soviet and post-Soviet sphere: Zoya ​Anatolyevna 
Kosmodemyanskaya, Manshuk ​Zhiengalikyzy​ ​Mametova, and Lyudmila ​Mikhailovna 
Pavlichenko (see Appendix A for pertinent biographical information). The choice of these three 
cases was based upon both similar and contrasting elements in their backgrounds, as well as the 
plethora of material in each of their biographies which has allowed them to exist as memory 
totems following their own deaths and/or the end of the war. All three women saw combat in the 
Great Patriotic War and were later made Heroes of the Soviet Union in recognition of their 
service, thus officially recognizing them and incorporating them into (supra)national narratives. 
All three were combatants - their primary wartime activity was killing, rather than medical or 
aviation services. For this reason, neither nurses nor the women of ​588th Night Bomber 
Regiment will be featured in the analysis.  
A number of differences exist between the three chosen cases to investigate how 
contrasts effect their mnemonic regimes. Only one, Pavlichenko, survived the war and was able 
to articulate her own experiences in a published memoir, serving as a subject active in shaping 
narratives around her. Kosmodemyanskaya and Mametova both died in the war and could not 
actively influence how their narratives were presented. Two were Slavic - Pavlichenko born and 
raised in what is now present day Ukraine, and Kosmodemyanskaya in Tambov Oblast, and later 
Moscow - and one non-Slavic - Mametova, an ethnic Kazakh raised in what is now Almaty; 
these contrasts allow for a partial examination in to how overlapping identities may or may not 
affect the mnemonic practices. These differences were chosen in order to see how ethnic 
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differences may have influenced and compounded depictions during the Soviet Union and the 
successor states formed by the ‘dominant’ ethnicities in the former SSRs.  
Material analyzed over the course of this study spans a wide temporal period and 
mediums, including memoirs, newspaper articles, statues, and film, both fictional and not. While 
disparate, this sampling attempts to show multiple different angles through which 
memorialization occurs, and the populations that produce them. A state-financed propagandistic 
telling of Zoya Kosmodemyanska’s life must be read differently than an artist’s painting of her 
death scene three years later, and yet similarities between them will show which characteristics 
have been widely disseminated among the population. The choice to use both fiction and 
nonfiction raises the question of what this study intends to analyze, and the answer to that is the 
representation of the female combatant in these mediums. If the portrayal and characteristics 
ascribed to her are consistent between fictionalized accounts and biographical materials, and 
between products aimed at different audiences at different points in time, then we can draw 
conclusions about what aspects of her rise to dominate the mnemonic regime surrounding her. It 
is precisely because a variety of disparate materials are analyzed that her place in collective 
memory can be identified and analyzed, instead of assuming that its shaped by the nature of the 
media (ie., film tropes, fictional archetypes, or memoir self-aggrandizing). That said, particular 
attention has been given to visual representations, based on their historic importance in shaping 
the Soviet consciousness.  
Harking back to its uses by the Bolshevik government at the end of the revolutionary 
period, visual media presented the best means for educating and shaping the masses.  Drawing 100
100 Bonnell, 267. 
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on Jay Winter’s reasoning, that visual media - film, television, museums, etc. - is a “theatre of 
memory”, a specific type of ‘collective remembrance’ - “understood as activities shared by 
collectives, groups of people in the public domain”. These theatres are “spaces where those who 
were not there see the past not in terms of their own personal memoirs, but rather in terms of 
public representations of the memories of those who came before”.  This does, however, come 101
with the acknowledgement that films produced during state socialism only reached mass 
audiences after scrutiny and censorship by the state to ensure that they abided by official 
narratives. With this noted, I believe such films are still valuable as part of an analysis of 
mnemonic regimes, as while they may not represent ‘free’ artistic expression and critical looks at 
their subjects, as indicators of collective memory they provide evidence of what qualities and 
people were being emphasized by the state and imparted onto the collective.  
Furthermore, though she writes on the topic of literature and its representation of women 
under state socialism, Barbara Einhorn succinctly identifies a conflict at the core of representing 
the female combatant to the post-Soviet generation; “...The shock of transition is currently 
muting this aspiration, reducing it for many to be the ‘fear of freedom’. There is a desire to 
escape into compensatory models and images which might assuage the pain of the present. ...It is 
perhaps not so curious, then, that the current search for identity involves a retreat from 
unaccustomed complexity, a reaching out for the presumed simplicity of a past agrarian idyll.”  102
If the war is a noted period of social upheaval, then the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the 
101 Jay Winter, ​Remembering War: The Great War Between Historical Memory and History in 
the Twentieth Century​ (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006)., 2. 
102 Einhorn, 217-218. 
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various challenges faced by post-Soviet states also serve as periods where, potentially, gender 
roles and depictions of women are altered. 
Secondly, this study intends to be partly historiographical in nature as well, and trace the 
evolution or consistencies in history of Soviet women combatants using these three case studies. 
Still, while taking into account differences in how historians have approached female combatants 
and their role in the Soviet experience of the war, the main focus of the study is on fluctuations 
within memory culture concerning them. As such, historical writing, such as Lyuba 
Vinogradova’s work on women of the Red Army is primarily treated as a product of its context, 
asking why in 2017 Vinogradova may speak about her subjects the way she does, and if it is 
consistent with how these women were discussed in 1989 or 1968. These are as treated examples 
of what Jonathan Brooks Platt called ‘chronotropic hybridity’ - pieces meant to reference and be 
representative of two distinct time periods/Bakhtinian chronotopes simultaneously.   103
Use of memoirs  falls in line with the “peculiarly Soviet form of autobiography”, which 104
tended to receive memoirs as a recording of individual memories for distribution among the 
collective. These are personal narratives ‘bearing witness’ to events that readers would not have 
experienced, so that they would not be lost to subsequent generations or ‘glossed over’ by 
government accounts.  In the pattern established by Lenin’s widow, N. K. Krupskaya, Soviet 105
103 Jonathan Brooks Platt, “Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya between Sacrifice and Extermination,” 
New Formations​, 2016, 48–70,​ ​https://doi.org/10.398/newf:89/90.03.2016​, 57-61. 
104 Throughout the essay I will use the term ‘memoirs’ or ‘biography’ in English, with an 
awareness that in Russian, the terms ‘мемуарная литература’ or ‘документальная литература’ 
are used instead. The connotation of ‘literature’ as containing literary elements and command of 
speech is lost in the English terms, and place greater emphasis on the documentary aspects of the 
work. Toby W. Clyman and Judith Vowles, eds., “Introduction,” in ​Russia Through Women’s 
Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia​ (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
19696), 6. 
105 Ibid, 7. 
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memoirs serve more as “testimonial narratives” or “sources of mass origin”, produced by an 
individual that is still subsumed within the collective identity of Sovietism. Women’s war 
memoirs in particular are, to borrow Roger Markwick’s phrasing, “women worthies” - a type of 
instructional material to be read by other women in order for them to model their behavior after 
females who had achieved some great feat.  Furthermore, as Barbara Walker argues, the 106
autobiographical experience of writing and selling memoirs are “ways that their authors, as 
participants in Russian culture, view the world: how they think of their past, and how they 
connect it to their present; how they believe that society should work and what they see as 
appropriate or ideal social, economic and political behavior” . The two main memoirs used in 107
this study are Lyudmila Pavlichenko’s 2015 work - published in Russian as ​Ya - snaiper. V 
boyax za Sevastopol i Odeccy , and in English as ​Lady Death: Memoirs of Stalin’s Sniper​, and 108
Lybov Kosmodemyaskaya’s 1953 work  ​The Story of Zoya and Shura .  109 110
The various films analyzed are meant to only serve as potentially more nuanced examples 
of female combatants; a statue is static and memoirs lack visuals and framings which can 
dramatically alter depictions and perceptions. Rather than trying to serve as feminist critiques or 
readings of the films, my interest remains firmly on how the films remain consistent or in 
106 Roger D. Markwick, “‘A Sacred Duty’: Red Army Women Veterans Remembering the Great 
Fatherland War, 1941-1945,” ​Australian Journal of Politics and History​ 54, no. 3 (2008): 
403–20, 405. 
107 Barbara Walker, “On Reading Soviet Memoirs: A History of the ‘Contemporaries’ Genre as 
an Institution of Russian Intelligentsia Culture from the 1790s to the 1970s”, ​Russian Review​, 59 
(July 2000): 327-352, quoted in Markwick 2008, 420. 
108 ​Russian: ​Я - снайпер: В боях за Севастополь и Одессу 
109 While not explicitly a memoir in that it is an author writing about themselves in a 
documentary fashion, it is a mother writing about her two children in a documentary way, and I 
believe the term can still be applied to the work. Important distinctions between the author’s 
self-referencing and L. Kosmodemyanskaya’s work will be discussed as appropriate.  
110 Russian:​ ​Повест за Зоя и Шура 
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contrast to other theaters of memory. Particularly as film has always been set upon a pedestal in 
the Russian-speaking world, and the versions of female combatants they show audiences will, in 































In many ways it is best to begin an analysis with Lyudmila Pavlichenko for in both literal 
and figurative terms, she served as a poster-girl for the women of the Red Army. Still credited as 
the highest scoring female sniper of all time, as a historical figure Pavlichenko remains of 
interest to military and cultural historians, especially after the publication of her memoirs. 
However, as a mnemonic figure, Pavlichenko has not had the same echo that other Soviet female 
combatants have managed to produce; while still discussed and mentioned, her name has not 
managed to generate the same symbolic energy as her contemporaries, like Kosmodemyanskaya, 
due to a lack of ability to be adaptable to narratives over time. Her survival through the war may 
drive the inflexibility in her depictions, or her lack of salience as a mnemonically symbolic 
figure. These elements that have not made her as prominent a mnemonic figure despite the 
aberration of a highly skilled female sniper are worthwhile to identify before embarking on 
analyses of others. 
During the 1940s, Pavlichenko was the subject of propaganda and journalism expected to 
show the Soviet Army in the best possible light, capable of producing soldiers of uniquely high 
caliber in skill and motivation. Her success in battle early in the war meant that she could quickly 
be identified and used by Party apparati in public relations at home and abroad. When looking at 
articles written about and discussing her, two main traits stand out as being frequently connected 
to Pavlichenko - her physical appearance, and her sniping skills. Her appearance is further 
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broken down into two distinct elements, being her youth and her attractiveness/femininity, which 
Pavlichenko herself attributes as part of what made her a useful agent in war propaganda. A 1942 
pamphlet published by the USSR People’s Navy Commissariat (later republished in ​Izvestiya​) 
includes the following description:  
The wind rustled her close cropped fluffy hair, which seemed as soft as that of a child. A 
silken lock of hair fluttered over her clear, prominent maiden’s brow. Her delicate, 
nervous face breathed with an expression of impetuous instability, of a profound passion 
of character. ...But after a minute [her eyes] lit up with a certain ​joie de vivre ​[sic], with 
such a child-like transparency, that they illuminated everything around.  111
 
Twenty-six at the time, Pavlichenko was hardly old, but the repeated description of her 
child-like attributes suggest either someone much younger or someone with much less 
intelligence (a fact that she herself seemed to have taken umbrage with). Instead, this description 
does illicit a specific sadness that such a childlike person would be sent out to war, and that her 
marksmanship is reminiscent of a prodigy, which even seventy years later is still discussed in 
such terms.  However, it was not the dominant take on her, as other articles and descriptions of 112
her take the opposite approach. Instead of depicting a child, they describe her as an Amazon:  
On 29 August 1942, many newspapers reprinted a brief report to the effect that, 
Twenty-six-year-old Lieutenant Lyudmila Pavlichenko, a bewitching warrior princess 
who has the highest individual score among the best snipers of the Red Army, yesterday 
did two things she could never have imagined when, a few weeks ago, during the defence 
[sic] of Sevastopol, she shot her 309th fascist. 
 
1) She arrived in Washington, becoming the first Amazon of the Red Army to visit the 
capital of the United States. 
2) She spent the night at the White House as a guest of President Roosevelt and 
America’s First Lady. 
 
111 B.A. Lavrenyov, “Lyudmila Pavlichenko”, (USSR People’s Navy Commissariat​, ​1945), 
quoted Pavlichenko, 169-170 
112 Pregler, x-xi. 
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Miss Pavlichenko has been awarded the Order of Lenin and wounded on four occasions.”
 113
 
The warrior-princess approach aligns more with the emphasis upon her hatred of 
Germans and her body count she herself puts forth in memoirs, and is echoed in different 
publications; “With her rifle Lyudmila Pavlichenko wiped out 309 Germans at Odessa and 
Sevastopol. ‘This is the right and proper attitude to adopt towards the Germans. If you don’t kill 
them at once, you’ll have no end of trouble,’ she once wrote to her mother”.  When materials 114
were either directly quoting her or written from her perspective, this aspect appears to be more 
prominent. Commentary on her appearance and youth were more dominant in others’ 
descriptions of her, as most evident in her interactions with English-language press while in the 
United States. Questions directed at her concerned makeup and fashion, while her answers 
emphasized the conditions in Russia or her wartime activities.  “As Pavlichenko toured the 115
United States, many American servicemen cautioned their sisters, sweethearts and daughters 
‘not’ to enlist in the military” . Abroad, she was used to stir the pot in America, which was then 116
able to be transported back into the USSR as evidence of capitalism’s flaws - their focus on 
materialism by directing questions about fashion to a war hero, their unwillingness to let 
able-bodied women do patriotic duties, and America’s ignorance of the struggle the Soviets had 
been facing for one long and bloody year. Several of the most oft-repeated lines from her time in 
113 “Guerrilla queen at Washington”, ​Press and Journal, ​29 August 1924, quoted in 
Vinogradova, 34-35. 
114 Pavlichenko, 171. 
115 Pavlichenko, 185-186; “Lyudmila Pavlichenko ‘Lady Death’: History’s Deadliest Female 
Sniper” (AETN UK, 2020), 
https://www.history.co.uk/article/lyudmila-pavlichenko-lady-death-historys-deadliest-female-sni
per​. 
116 J. Holm, ​Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution ​(revised edition), (New York: 
Presidio, 1992), quoted in Froula, 156. 
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the United States are rebukes of American journalists - sharp-tongued critiques, and assurances 
that “in Russia there are no parades at the moment” - frequently portrayed in the black-and-white 
narrative one expects is clouded by Cold War mentality looking back.  117
The result of many of these newspaper and pamphlet descriptions is to highlight a 
discrepancy between what people wanted out of Pavlichenko and what she as an active agent 
wished to convey. Both Soviet and American press in directing their attention to her youth, dress, 
and grooming tried to put her in the framework of women at the time. In contrast, Pavlichenko 
had been through two major sieges and nearly two full years of frontline experiences, away from 
any role other than a soldier. Throughout her memoirs, she is determined to speak on her military 
experience rather than her experience as a woman in military; most indicative is that the Russian 
title of her memoirs ​Ya - snaiper. V boyax za Sevastopol i Odeccy​ lacks any indicator that it 
would have been written by a woman, while the translators’ choice is to ascribe the book, and 
her words, by the moniker “Lady Death”. Her absence of reaffirming feminine gender roles 
should not be taken as ‘feminist’, or an attempt to dismantle stereotypes about what a woman 
would be capable of, but like Adrienne Harris points to in her analysis of Yulia Drunina’s  118
wartime poetry, a lack of affirmation does not equate a negation, and there is a complexity in 
identities that Pavlichenko occupies. Woman enough to not reject portrayals of beauty - only 
childishness - but aligning with soldiers and veterans with whom she shared her experience.  In 119
this sense, Pavlichenko’s experiences as conveyed through her memoirs reflect Anna Krylova’s 
findings on non-oppositional gender cooperation. More notable, however, is the real lack of an 
117 Pavlichenko, 180-189. 
118 Yulia Vladimirovna Drunina (1924 - 1991) 
119 Harris, “Yulia Drunina”, 649.  
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individual/subjective presence. In her accounts of Sevastopol, for example, one feels the 
narrative distance as if reading a novel with an omniscient narrator through its frequent citations 
from other soldiers or Tolstoy. While these give the account an authoritative weight, they are not 
the personal reflections one would anticipate in a memoir, particularly of a highly charged event.  
Pavlichenko’s memoirs read as a restrained and uncontroversial account of her wartime 
activities, supplemented with excerpts from others’ journals, newspapers, and official 
publications to add to the veracity of her observations and experiences. They do not deviate from 
the official regime; when Pavlichenko observes that “nobody saw anything romantic” in sniping, 
or that she bristled against a particular characterization of herself, they are not critiques against 
any higher authority but harmless, non confrontational notes on culture or against individuals. 
Read against the text, then, it is evident that Pavlichenko knew how to navigate party politics and 
use her wartime celebrity to secure a stable future for herself and family. Following the war’s 
end, Pavlichenko had a career in academia - proving Maria Bucur’s words that memoirs, while 
“an exercise in self-representation and [...] a clear form of recollection, situating the personal 
experience presumably in the center of the narrative. … It does not, however, provide a global 
picture of wartime experience, because all the authors tend to be relatively well, if not highly, 
educated and to come from urban areas. Therefore, what follows is an evocative rather than 
comprehensive analysis of the personal experience of the war”.  Pavlichenko, a professor, 120
would have fallen into that category of highly educated; similarly, as a trained historian, she tries 
to present events objectively, with frequent quotations from others’ journals and letters, and 
newspaper articles and pamphlets included wholecloth with minimal commenting on her 
120 Bucur, 174. 
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emotional reaction to them. Minimal time is spent on her family life and upbringing, and 
descriptions of school-life are kept to a bare minimum, in contrast to memoirs such as Yulia 
Zhukova’s , which firmly centers the events as ​her​ subjective experiences and responses. One 121
walks away with the impression that Pavlichenko did not deviate from the official regime - 
mnemonically or politically; there are no suggestions of someone caught up in a storm or thrust 
into a spotlight unwillingly, but of a soldier who knew their duty from the moment of the war’s 
announcement and, at most, didn’t like to be spoken down to by those who weren’t on the field 
with her. In short, her memoirs remind of Alexevich’s anecdote about the husband and wife who 
both served. The official ​History of the Great Patriotic War ​did not allow for ‘feminized’ 
emotional accounts, and Pavlichenko kept this perception in mind. Ironically, her subjective 
experiences have, in her memoirs, been rendered as objectively as possible. 
Moving forward in time to a 1969 collection of essays on heroes of the Soviet Union 
published by ​Politizdat​, Pavlichenko’s section again repeatedly emphasizes her abilities as a 
sniper above all else - from sections placing the reader in battle alongside her division and her 
position, to quotes about her later training of snipers: “The newspaper of the Primorye army 
reported: "Comrade Pavlichenko perfectly studied the habits of the enemy and mastered sniper 
tactics... Almost all the prisoners captured at Sevastopol speak with a sense of animal fear about 
our super-sharp shooters: "We have been suffering the most losses recently from the bullets of 
Russian snipers.””  The only exception to this description comes near the end of the essay, in 122
121 Yulia Konstantinovna Zhukova (1926 - ) was a sniper and junior sergeant whose memoirs 
Girl With a Sniper Rifle​ (Russian: ​Девушка со снайперской винтовкой) ​were published in 
2006. 
122 “На слете снайперов Павличенко рассказала о том, как в самой сложной обстановке 
удается ей обучать товарищей снайперскому делу. Она не скрывала от своих учеников ни 
риска, ни особой опасности своей военной профессии. В апреле на снайперском слете ей 
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an interesting, almost accidental-feeling, observation on the differences between her 
self-perception and the perception others’ had of her: 
Performing tasks and in short hours of respite, Pavlichenko continued to work with young 
snipers. The young woman considered herself an old man. However, all who remained in 
the ranks, having started their military path from the very beginning of the war, rightfully 
considered themselves old fighters.... Gray streaks appeared in the black hair of this 
extraordinarily beautiful woman, whose soulful face was well known throughout the 
country. There were correspondences about her in the Central press — her courage, 
experience, and self-control helped thousands of people to put out what seemed 
unbearable.  123
 
The conflict between ‘considering herself an old man’ while others saw an 
‘extraordinarily beautiful woman’ is one whose implications are much heavier than the 
description would suggest. When participation in war leaves one stripped of gender, 
dehumanized by combat, the gap widens between how the verteran-subject views themselves 
versus how outsiders will see them.  
Moving from written publications to monuments, there is a notable absence of statues to 
Pavlichenko despite her wartime celebrity. There are memorial signs dedicated to her in Odessa 
был вручен диплом. Газета Приморской армии сообщала: «Товарищ Павличенко отлично 
изучила повадки врага и овладела снайперской тактикой... Почти все пленные, 
захваченные под Севастополем, с чувством животного страха говорят о наших 
сверхметких стрелках: «Больше всего потерь мы несем последнее время от пуль русских 
снайперов».” Л Руднева, “Людмила Павличенко,” Роль Женщин в великой отчественной 
воине, n.d.,​ ​http://www.a-z.ru/women_cd2/12/11/i80_128.htm​. 
123 “Выполняя задания и в короткие часы передышек, Павличенко продолжала заниматься 
с молодыми снайперами. Себя молодая женщина считала уже старичком. Впрочем, все, 
кто оставался в строю, начав свой воинский путь с самого начала войны, по праву считали 
себя старыми бойцами. Так оно и было. День здесь был равен месяцу, иногда году. Седые 
прядки появились в черных волосах этой необыкновенно красивой женщины, чье 
одухотворенное лицо хорошо знала вся страна. О ней появлялись корреспонденции в 
центральной прессе — ее мужество, опыт, выдержка помогли тысячам людей выдюжить 
то, что казалось невыносимым.” 
Ibid. 
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and Sevastopol, but no different to those one sees throughout the former Soviet Union indicating 
a person of note is associated with the building (see Figure 1). The largest and most prominent 
monument she is associated with to is the Monument to the Second Siege of Sevastopol, 
constructed in 1967, but it is not dedicated to her individually but rather to all those who 
defended the city in 1941. Her name is listed on the memorial wall beneath the abstract stone 
figure carved in typical Soviet brutalist fashion. The absence of individualized statues or 
monuments can be attributed to the fact that she did not die in the war, and there was a lack of 
urgent need to create the proxy-corpse to honor her memory - for a direct counter to Pavlichenko 
is Nina Onilova , who has a specific statue erected in her individual memory in Odessa, a site 124
separate from her gravestone (see Figure 2). At the time of the construction of the Second Siege 
of Sevastopol’s monument, Pavlichenko was also alive; it would not be a stretch to assume that 
she, alongside other surviving veterans of the siege, would have been there to commemorate its 
completion. 
The most significant challenge to Pavlichenko to emerge in post-Soviet discourse 
surrounding her biography is the veracity of her kill count, though suspicions had been present 
since the war period. In the foreword to the English edition of her memoirs, Martin Pregler rather 
aggressively puts forth the claim that her memoir “sets the record straight about much of the of 
the ill-founded criticism and inaccurate writing that has been subsequently aimed at her, 
particularly suggestions that she was not a sniper at all, but the product of the Red Army 
propaganda machine”.  Doubt dogs articles and mentions of Pavlichenko in recent times, 125
124 Nina Andreyvna Onilova (1921 - 1942) 
125 Martin Pregler, “Foreword,” in ​Lady Death: The Memoirs of Stalin’s Sniper​, by Lyudmila 
Pavlichenko (Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2018), ix–xiii, ix. 
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although there are those who claim that the rumors against her originated within the Soviet 
armed forces during the years of her service. Journalist Natalia Antonova, whose grandfather 
served in the Red Army not with but contemporaneously to Pavlichenko, writes, ​“my grandfather 
blamed the persistent rumor that Pavlichenko was a fraud on male resentment. There was also 
the fact that Pavlichenko repeatedly rebuffed the advances of her superior officers, which only 
furthered that resentment”.  This connects to the impression left on historians such as Catherine 126
Merridale that a primary push of women in the Red Army was to humiliate and inspire men to do 
more; the reverse effect, naturally, would be that women would become the targets of resentment 
and anger as a result of feelings of male inadequacy. If combined with Pavlichenko’s sexual 
unavailability to powerful men, it is unsurprising that out of anger, some may have looked for 
ways to discredit her success and notoriety. 
Lyuba Vinogradova, rather abruptly after describing Palichenko in her history on the 
women of the Soviet sniper corps, turns critical of the veracity of Pavlichenko’s fame and 
exploits:  
Why did this woman, about whom, until the fall of Sevastopol, nobody knew anything, 
become famous so precipitately? Was it because the top brass, who until then had 
overlooked her spectacular successes in battle, suddenly came to their senses? ...Why did 
Pavlichenko almost never show off her shooting skills during her tour of America? In his 
memoirs, [Vladimir] Pchelintsev writes that, wherever they went, people could not wait 
to see how well the Red Army snipers could shoot. ...Pchelintsev only once mentions 
Lyudmila shooting during the visit, and describes her performance as “slapdash”.  127
 
126 Natalia Antonova, “The Life and Myths of Lyudmila Pavlichenko, Soviet Russia’s Deadliest 
Sniper” (The World, March 9, 2018), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-03-09/life-and-myths-lyudmila-pavlichenko-soviet-russias-dead
liest-sniper​. 
127 Vinogradova, 43-45. 
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She casts doubt on the authenticity of Pavlichenko’s ‘sniper record book’, and even 
discusses the destruction of all records of the Maritime Army, with which Pavlichenko had 
served, so that no contemporary documentation of her tally or her name as a sniper attached to 
her regiment exists. “Almost all we know about her is based on her own words, which are full of 
contradictions”.   Pavlichenko is not the only figure to receive such criticisms and suspicions; 128
Roza Shanina , another well-known sniper who perished during the war, is also a subject of 129
suspicion in Vinogradova’s biography. The author goes into detail about idiosyncrasies in Roza’s 
diaries to portray her as someone who kept coded accounts of love affairs, was not satisfied 
merely being a sniper due to its lack of adventure and danger, wrote poems whose shallow 
substance was reflective of a lack of life experience, and ultimately asking if women like Shanin 
and Pavlichenko were patriots or “madwomen out for glory”.  As mentioned earlier, 130
Pavlichenko appeared not only to be aware of these rumors against her but tried to refute them - 
a privilege afforded to her by survival, as she can herself become a mnemonic warrior in the 
debate around her. However ultimately, the suspicion is not enough to remove Pavlichenko’s 
inclusion from Vinogradova’s books on Soviet heroines, nor has it risen to the level of national 
debate - even in Ukraine, Pavlichenko’s birthplace, where mnemonic debates with warriors on 
both sides have seemed to seize on any figure of note.  
If there is proof that Pavlichenko’s biography has not become the stuff of a contested 
collective memory it is that she has become a footnote in Ukrainian mnemonic regimes, even as 
128 Ibid, 47. 
129 Roza Georgiyevna Shanina (1924-1945) was a senior sergeant credited with fifty-nine 
confirmed kills and perished in East Prussia late in the war. Her wartime diary survives today 
and has seen publication in both Russian and English. 
130 Ibid, 208-220. 
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other wartime heroes and heroines are either Ukrainized or Russified. Despite usage in social 
media memes associated with right-wing extreme nationalists in Ukraine and among rebel 
groups in Donbass, Pavlichenko has not emerged as a polarizing figure in larger mnemonic 
discourse surrounding Ukraine, the Soviet Union, and the Second World War.  In discussion of 131
contemporary Ukrainian war memory and women’s roles in World War II, Kateryna 
Kobachenko the country’s Institute of National Remembrance and their projects that attempts to 
highlight specific women from the Ukrainian SSR or of Ukrainian heritage - from which 
Pavlichenko is largely absent.  Presuming this could be a result of her connection to the Soviet 132
state, Kobachenko corrects that, stating that, “​the Soviet heroes of World War II who were not 
involved in Soviet crimes and had a connection with Ukraine remain among the officially 
recognized heroes of modern Ukraine [sic].”  As an example, she points to the success of the 133
2015 dramatized biography​ of Pavlichenko which was released in Russian and Ukrainian 
theaters. 
Titled ​Battle for Sevastopol​ in Russia and ​Indestructible  in Ukraine, the film was a 134
joint effort by both countries; despite the timing of the film’s release, it was able to achieve 
131 Amandine Regamey, “Falsehood in the War in Ukraine: The Legend of Women Snipers,” 
Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Socities​, no. 17 (2016): 1–29. 
132 “‘ВІЙНА НЕ РОБИТЬ ВИНЯТКІВ. ЖІНОЧІ ІСТОРІЇ ДРУГОЇ СВІТОВОЇ’. 
ІНФОРМАЦІЙНІ МАТЕРІАЛИ ДЛЯ ЗМІ ДО ВШАНУВАНЬ 8-9 ТРАВНЯ 2016 РОКУ,” 




133 Kateryna Kobchenko, “Women’s Faces of Ukrainian Contemporary Memory of World War II 
as Exemplified by Kyiv Urban Space,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung Foundation, May 15, 2020, 
https://ua.boell.org/en/2020/05/15/zhinochi-oblichchya-suchasnoi-pamyati-ukrainciv-pro-drugu-
svitovu-viynu-na-prikladi 
134 Ukrainian: ​Незламна​. 
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financial success  ​, a fact that its director, Sergey Mokritskiy, attributes to the film’s lack of a 135
“clear ideological component”.  By choosing to follow Pavlichenko and her personal 136
relationships instead of any larger national narrative, the film attempts to appeal to audiences on 
both sides of a mnemonic binary. It presupposes that Pavlichenko is exceptional and noteworthy 
out of a fear that showing how Soviet culture and/or institutions shaped her into a legendary 
sniper would be perceived by its international audience. Looking at it as how Pavlichenko is 
remembered and portrayed to a cross-cultural collective is where the film becomes difficult to 
pin down, as there are nearly three distinct versions of her seen throughout the film’s two-hour 
run time - her pre-war, while in battle, and during her time in the United States. Furthermore, 
much of her characterization is done in contrast to or via her relationship to others, particularly 
men, and especially due to the three distinct love interests she has throughout the film. This 
splitting of her characterization and relationship is emblematic of what Kubik and Bernhard refer 
to as a a “fractured regime” surrounding Pavlichenko as a historical figure; despite the wealth of 
evidence about her as a historical figure, she lacks a codified mnemonic narrative, and so the 
film attempts to portray her in multiple ways at once rather than in the one unified light which 
135 Box office results worldwide at $9,054,676, in Russia at RUB 435,468,256 ($8,702,274), in 
Ukraine at UAH 14 million (approx. $530,000). “Ukrainian Film Heads the Top-10 Weekend 
Box Office in Ukraine,” Ukraine Crisis Media Center, August 9, 2017, 
https://uacrisis.org/en/60164-ukrainian-film-heads-top-10-weekend-box-office-ukraine​. 
136 The film has one particular scene where, at a press conference in America, Pavlichenko is 
confronted by a Russian dissident and asked to answer about the Finnish war, Soviet aggression, 
and “what they are doing to your own people”, but the press conference is concluded before 
Pavlichenko can answer and thus, have any potentially-controversial statement attributed to her. 
The film never returns to this plot point or mentions the dissident again; Kobchenko, “Women’s 
Faces of Ukrainian Contemporary Memory of World War II as Exemplified by Kyiv Urban 
Space.” 
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audiences would know her best. The element that stands out as most consistent through her 
portrayal is her exceptional sniping skills. 
By presenting scenes out of order chronologically, the film shows these three different 
versions of Pavlichenko overlapping one another but not in harmony with each other. The 
connection between these iterations is the exceptionalism others see in her - repeatedly, people of 
note call her “special”, “unique”, capable of “outfighting” both the men and the best sniper in the 
German army. Pre-war, viewers are shown Pavlichenko as a serious-minded student attempting 
to receive praise from her emotionally distant and withholding father, an NKVD officer and 
veteran of the Civil War who is chastised by his wife for “all her life you were making a boy out 
of [Lyudmila]”. Her first time at a shooting range - where the teacher is still walking her through 
how to load bullets into the gun - she achieves first place in a marksmanship contest, and is 
singled out in school to participate in a six-month shooting program as a result. During the war, 
she is repeatedly said to be preternaturally skilled in the arts of war, a soldier of note to both 
generals and her commanding officer, with whom she wishes to pursue a relationship but he 
holds back. Finally, in her time in America, Eleanor Roosevelt takes a particular interest in 
Pavlichenko - first out of a “want to understand her as a woman” by having her stay in the White 
House (when “no other Soviet citizen ever been invited” there before), and then in a maternal 
way, as they are shown cooking together, sharing cultural customs, and Roosevelt comforts 
Pavlichenko during episodes of PTSD and derision by her Soviet handler. The result, rather than 
showing Lyudmila at different stages of her life and how the war impacts her, presents an almost 
schizophrenic view of Pavlichenko, unable to decide if she is serious, someone out for the 
competition of shooting and for glory in battle, or emotionally battered by the war. This is 
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compounded by how little Pavlichenko as a character speaks, and as an audience we are left 
understanding a throughline of her motivations. Instead, the most viewers see is the effect she 
has on those around her - particularly, her love interests.  
While Roger Markwick remarks that “sexual relations between ​frontoviki ​and 
frontovichki ​undoubtedly has been one of the silences in the historical and private writing about 
the Fatherland War”, ​Battle for Sevastopol​ places romance at the forefront.  The film gives her 137
three distinct love interests over the film’s run time - a Jewish doctor named Boris, her 
commanding officer Makarov, and a sniper based on her second husband Kitsenko  - who are 138
listed both in order of introduction but in the level of attachment Lyudmila feels towards them. 
Her two closer relationships are with fellow soldiers, with whom she has both playfully 
competitive and philosophically meaningful relationships, culminating in a sex scene and the 
implication that Kitsenko is the father of her child. It avoids any mention of her first real husband 
and Rotislav Pavlichenko’s father - instead, making Pavlichenko her father’s surname as well, 
and so that Lyudmila is unmarried/virginal when she leaves for the front. Each of these men sees 
greatness in Pavlichenko and is motivated by her - love for her drives Boris to serve as a 
frontline doctor, Makarov makes sure that his gun and final words make their way to her, and 
Kitsenko and she have intercourse in the beseiged Sevastopol, having found in each other a 
reason to fight. The decision to add romance to a war film likely broadens the appeal, but also 
significantly feminizes Pavlichenko, showing her as the object of care and suggesting that her 
survival is due to these men looking out for her - a view which is especially reinforced by the 
ending, where Boris gives up his evacuation pass so that Lyudmila can escape Sevastopol and he 
137 Markwick 2008, 417. 
138 Alexei Kitsenko in life, while his film counterpart is named Leonid Kitsenko. 
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can die instead of her. Her relationships with Makarov and Kitsenko are suggestive of her 
relationship with her father - she pursues Makarov despite his attempts to deny her, in a similar 
way to how her father denied her attention at the film’s start. Notably, while all three men die in 
the war, the audience never sees their deaths or bodies on screen. Aside from the Germans which 
Pavlichenko - sometimes quite sadistically - kills, Morkritskiy’s ​Battle for Sevastopol ​is a war 
film light on depictions of corpses. 
Perhaps the most telling scene in the film, however, is not with any of these men, but 
after Kitsenko is killed and Pavlichenko is brought to a hospital. When the Germans report that 
she has also been killed in battle, a propagandist and his photographers arrive and override 
doctor’s orders to have Pavlichenko marked unfit for combat due to injury. “Pavlichenko is not 
just a soldier anymore. With this, she becomes a symbol” says the propagandist, announcing too 
that more Germans will be arriving and that his men “will be going to battle with her name on 
their lips”. Even her falsely reported death catapults her into usefulness. As will be seen in later 
sections, the surviving veteran presented less opportunity for imagination in memory than the 
wartime dead could.  
Pavlichenko survived the war which meant, unlike Onilova or many other women, she 
could not be canonized as a martyr; rather, what was emphasized was her capacity to kill and her 
skill with a gun.  What this meant is that when the war was over, her most noteworthy trait - 139
being a sniper - could not be repurposed for peacetime. She even admits so herself - the title for 
the final chapter of her memoirs translates to “I am sidelined!”, and contains lamentations about 
how the sniper's ‘art’ was being phased out of emphasis by the Ministry of Defence in favor of 
139 Ibid, 206. 
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atomic bombs. When the most consistently remembered element of her life is her preternatural 
marksmanship, it then becomes understandable why the film - and, at large, her mnemonic 
regime - fails to present a unified character. Instead it begins to rely on an amalgamation of 
various other traits attributed to female combatants and Soviet girl-heroines - romance, trying to 
live up to paternal expectations, an ideal student and Soviet citizen, and a desired return to 
girlhood and femininity subsumed by war - in order to present a figure that its audiences could 
recognize.  While Lyudmila Pavlichenko’s memoirs show a personal adherence to official 140
narratives and regimes, failing to deviate, she as a mnemonic figure lacks cohesion enough to 
stand out from other female combatants, and is blended into the archetype created by those girls 





















If Lyudmila Pavlichenko can be considered the poster-child of women in the Red Army, 
then Kosmodemyanskaya is the model against which all female combatants are measured. Zoya - 
“Tanya” as she was first known to Soviet press - was among the first partisans who had their 
tragic end known throughout the country, and among the few whose biographies were most 
extensively fleshed out in the public eye. Thus she served in a real sense as the ‘archetype’ of the 
female war hero - and as the “gestalt” for wartime dead girls to stand against the victim imagery.
 Kosmodemyanskaya was one of the martyrs with whom every Soviet soldier became familiar 141
- transcending national and ethnic bounds to form the core of a Soviet pantheon of war heroes.  142
From the moment of her death, images of her began to circulate and be compounded upon, 
entering into the collective unconscious of the wartime public. Much of the power afforded to 
her story and memory can be crystallized down to a single instance - not her death itself, but the 
photographs of her corpse, which became widely seen by the Soviet public  (see Figure 3). While 
photographs of her execution were found on the corpse of a German officer in Smolensk in 1943 
the photograph of her corpse cut down from the noose after suffering weeks of decay was taken 
by S.N. Strunnikov in January of 1942. It’s publication in ​Pravda, ​accompanied by an essay by 
Pyotr Lidov, was people’s main exposure to Zoya and her death.  The visual horror of her 143
141 Tippner, 371 
142 Roberto J. Carmack, “History and Hero-Making: Patriotic Narratives and the Sovietization of 
Kazakh Front-Line Propaganda, 1941-1945,” ​Central Asian Survey​ 33, no. 1 (2014): 95–112, 
103 
143  Pyotr Lidov. "Partizanskaya Tania". "Pioneer" newsletter. January–February 1942 
67 
corpse could be then paired with a number of different significances, and Kosmodemyanskaya’s 
memory buckles under the variants in symbolism and significance attributed to it.  
While initially introduced as ‘Tanya’, a pseudonym to an otherwise unknown partisan, 
this initial anonymity meant that both speculation and imagination could create whatever people 
needed or wanted. Recalling Breev and Kristeva, the Soviet press and ​Pravda ​readers knew 
nothing about the girl when confronted with the abject image of her postmortem photograph. She 
could have been anyone - and more poignantly, anyone’s daughter, anyone’s sister. While in this 
state of horror at the adjective image and the simultaneous empathic response her mysterious 
identity would produce, it did not matter who Tanya really was for her to be the everyman 
mourned as a proxy for the untold dead in that first year of war. Helpful in this interpretation are 
the closing lines to Lidov’s essay, which initially accompanied the photograph’s print - and, as 
Platt mentions, were printed directly opposite of Strunnikov’s photograph:  
Tanya was buried without honors, outside the village, under a weeping birch, and a 
blizzard blew the grave mound. And soon came those for whom Tanya in the dark 
December nights made her way to the west with her chest. 
  
Having stopped for a halt, the fighters will come here to bow to her ashes to the ground 
and say sincere Russian thanks to her. And to the father and mother, who gave birth to 
and raised the heroine; and the teachers who raised her; and comrades who strengthened 
her spirit. 
  
And the unfading glory will spread about her all over the Soviet land, and millions of 
people will think with love about the distant snow-covered grave, and Stalin will 
mentally come to the tombstone of his faithful daughter.  144
144 Russian: “Таню похоронили без почестей, за деревней, под плакучей березой, и вьюга 
завеяла могильный холмик. А вскоре пришли те, для кого Таня в тёмные декабрьские 
ночи грудью пробивала дорогу на запад. / Остановившись для привала, бойцы приедут 
сюда, чтобы до земли поклониться её праху и сказать ей душевное русское спасибо. И 
отцу с матерью, породившим на свет и вырастившим героиню; и учителям, воспитавшим 
её; и товарищам, закалившим её дух. / И немеркнущая слава разнесется о ней по всей 
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Eventually the partisan was identified as Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya and the symbolism 
easily switched when both state and public had a key actor to dispel questions about the girl - her 
own mother, Lybov Timofeena Kosmodemyanskaya. She wrote a pamphlet in 1942 titled “My 
Daughter Zoya”, which served as the basis for expanded memoirs later titled ​The Story of Zoya 
and Shura ​and published in 1953. These writings allowed readers into the interior of a grieving 
mother - to individualize and contextualize her mortem photographs to the collective, so that the 
Soviet public could not only grieve Zoya’s loss as a Russian woman killed by a foreign enemy, 
but be allowed to mourn her the same way the private family was.  ​They are one of the few 145
depictions of Zoya outside of the official mnemonic regime in that more of the focus is upon 
Zoya’s childhood and family life; in showing this perspective, however, what is reinforced to 
readers is the life and normalcy lost because of the war and her murder. They contain what claim 
to be first-hand witness accounts to Zoya’s death via a fellow female partisan, which reads as 
both consolations to a grieving mother and a prophecy for what was to come of Zoya 
postmortem:​"I have no words to console you with. I realize that the words do not exist that could 
console you in your grief. But I want to tell you this: the memory of Zoya will never die, it 
cannot die. She lives among us. She will arouse others to the struggle.”  146
советской земле, и миллионы людей будут с любовью думать о далёкой заснеженной 
могилке, и Сталин мысленно придёт к надгробию своей верной дочери.” Ibid. 
145 A note on the textuality of the photographs of Zoya’s death. Noting, however, the relative 
newness of photograph as an art form and of mass newspapers in the 1940s Soviet Union, it’s 
likely that a large amount of readers would be exposed to photographed death for the first time 
via this publication, and the empathic effect of such would be difficult to find comparison for.  
146 Lybov Kosmodemyanskaya, ​The Story of Zoya and Shura​, trans. Mike Bessler (Moscow: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 
http://gammacloud.org/features/zoya/story-zoya-shura/index.htm​, “Klava’s Story”. 
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In this sense it seems that Zoya was able to enter the collective imagination at the 
instance of her death - but also instantly used as a tool to motivate the sympathetic to the war 
cause. This effect was compounded upon by the immediacy of material released about Zoya - the 
1942 pamphlet, a film about her partisan activities and capture was released in 1944, and the 
1953 publication of Lybov’s memoirs all served to keep her daughter’s name and image fresh in 
the collective’s memory.  Rather than fading into the periphery, these repetitions would further 147
reinforce the importance of Zoya’s sacrifice and name. The effort came both from the top-down 
and the bottom-up as Lybov Kosmodemyanskaya, after her children’s death, championed their 
memory through public appearances and open letters. This extended after the war’s end as well. 
She would make appearances at monuments to Zoya and give speeches about her daughter on 
anniversaries and Party events.  A notable moment is when she wrote an open letter to 148
Elizabeth Moos, an American peace activist, in 1949 invoking Zoya’s name and the image of her 
death as an anti-war measure: 
Let the image of my Zoya, shouting words of truth under the gallows with the noose 
around her neck, give you the strength to face any persecutions and help you, even when 
threatened by the notorious un-American activities committee, to tell your people the 
truth, and to demand peace and democracy.  
… 
I am sending you an old photograph of my Zoya and Alexander, in the hope that the 
image of my children, who gave their young lives for the happiness of all mankind, will 
inspire you in the struggle against war and fascism.  149
 







This connection between both Zoya and her brother to wider anti-fascist and peacetime 
appeals is not a particularly repeated motif in her depictions. Neither is the connection between 
Zoya and her brother as ​both​ victims of Nazism. While Lybov ties both of her children together - 
their deaths connected events and part of a larger tragedy rather than individual losses in isolated 
incidents - Aleksandr Kosmodemyansky has not had the same long-lasting impact as his sister 
has had upon the Soviet and Russian consciousness. His tomb also stands in Novodevichy 
Cemetery, but it lacks the same large-scale memorial statue that his sister’s does, and there are 
few sites dedicated specifically to his memory.  A number of possibilities stand as to why 150
Shura was disconnected from his sister in mnemonic culture. Aleksandr died in April 1945, close 
to the conclusion of the war, and as a commander of an artillery regiment rather than as a 
volunteer partisan. His death, while tragic, is that of another young man in the service of his 
country - expected to a population which had grown numb to young men dying. Finally too, it is 
possible to turn to Arkadii Nedel and his essay on the metaphysics of childhoods under Stalinism 
- “the cultural value that is attributed to the dead child in Soviet ideology and concludes that, in 
death, the gender differences that are otherwise underplayed become important again”.  Both of 151
Lybov’s children and their memories are intertwined in her perspective, while at the culture writ 
large, the gendered differences made Zoya the more potent icon  
The complication in Kosmodemyanskaya’s depictions is that media productions of her 
death and dying circulated contemporaneously with photographs taken at the moment of her 
150 Most notable is the bust of Aleksandr Kosmodemyansky which stands in present-day 
Kaliningrad, and the minor planet 1977 Shura. Two additional planets - 2072 
Kosmodemyanskaya and 1793 Zoya - are named for his mother and sister respectively. 
Schmadel, Lutz D. ​Dictionary of Minor Planet Names. ​(Springer; Berlin and Heidelberg, 2003). 
151 Tippner, 383. 
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death. Artists were able to refer to ‘authentic’ references, and civilians could compare the 
products to these references, suggestive of a feedback loop in which the scene of her execution is 
reinforced by both primary and secondary materials. For an example of this, one can look at the 
comparison of the photographs of her execution scene (see Figures 4 to 6), the painting produced 
by Kukrynisky of the scene (see Figure 7), and a screenshot from director Lev Arnshtam’s​ Zoya 
(1944) (see Figure 9), which all cement the visual and visual coding of her death. Taking a 
moment to examine Kukrynisky’s painting - “standard social-realism” according to art critic 
Sophie Pinkman - one sees all eyes turned upon Zoya - here an androgynous figure, her black 
uniform almost reminiscent of the dark suits worn by Eugene Onegin. Her spectators include 
civilians and soldiers, who are not overtly identifiable as Germans until one examines the cuts of 
their coats and style of their hats. Her execution is a medieval moment, a hanging, that unites 
multiple strata of society. Yet while the Germans treat this as an attraction to photograph and 
stage, the common people are there without cameras, dressed in head scarfs and short coats, on 
horseback suggestive of a long journey that brought them to this instance. So perhaps, like 
Onegin, Zoya’s death produced a rippling effect felt as far away as the clouds of black smoke on 
the horizon.   152
Arnshtam’s ​Zoya, ​at the scene of the execution, brings audiences further into the moment 
- passed the border of soldiers and onlookers, close enough to see the expression on Zoya’s face - 
to transform them from a voyeur into a quasi-participant in the moment. Referencing Bronfen's 
question on if the depiction of death is meant to elicit an aesthetic or empathic response, it must 
be asked which route the film takes - aesthetic or empathic. Considering that the scene of her 
152 Sophie Pinkham, “Leninopad: Double Agents in Kyiv,” ​N+1​, Winter 2016, 
https://nplusonemag.com/issue-24/ukraine-supplement/leninopad/​. 
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execution is bookended by scenes of Zoya’s final moments in German captivity, and her face 
transposed over images of artillery, airplanes, and warfare, it seems evident that the film intends 
to bring its audience from a microscopic look at her death to its connection to the international 
scale of war. If viewers are being told to witness her stoicism in captivity and her execution as a 
prosthetic participant - unable to stop what they know to be an unjust act - then the empathy and 
frustration they feel for Zoya’s situation are to now be connected to the larger war effort. If 
viewers could do nothing for Zoya, then they can take their voyueristic frustration and put it to 
the Soviet war effort. 
This is, of course, precisely the film’s intended effect; produced by studio ​Soyuzdetfilm 
while in its wartime exile in Dushanbe, it’s 1944 release date still saw audiences living in a state 
of war when the hatred of Germans and mourning of the dead was still exceptionally raw. 
Quoting Harris again but bringing in Anna Froula’s analyses of the girl-heroine of Soviet 
children’s literature, Zoya as an archetype was meant to inspire her age group into action, 
motivate the population with the cruelty of her action - as proof, ​“Zoia’s brother Aleksandr 
exemplified the proper reaction to Zoia’s execution by becoming a tank commander seeking to 
avenge Zoia through his will to destroy the enemy”.  What is then interesting is that neither the 153
film nor painting take reference from the most striking and evocative photo that exists of Zoya - 
that of her corpse. Instead statues and monuments, pseudo-corpses, to her took up the task of 
spreading that image throughout the Soviet Union.  
The amount of statues of Zoya is both extensive, and their styles vary in their depictions 
of her. In general it becomes possible to classify them into two rough sections - those which 
153 Harris 2011, 278. 
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depict her in a more natural, ‘realistic’ depiction of the partisan hero and those which show an 
idealized, imaginary form,. The ur-example of the former would be the depiction of Zoya on 
display at Partizanskaya Station in Moscow (see Figure 10), which shows her armed with a rifle 
and dressed, while feminine, in boots and a sweater - clothing apt for guerilla warfare. This 
statue, sculpted in 1942 and placed in the station in May 1944, is akin to the Zoya seen in 
Arnshtam’s film, although already there is a shift away from androgyny in depictions. 
Furthermore, as Adrienne Harris points out, the placement in the metro station serves the purpose 
of positioning Zoya among the common people, amid the ‘great family’ that tied Muscovites and 
the Soviet people together stronger than blood.  It also is close to the original statue which 154
stood in Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow; that piece, created by E. A. Rudakov, stood in the 
cemetery from 1954 to 1986 and depicted her upright torso, hands positioned as if to draw a 
weapon and show her determination.  These are the earliest depictions of Zoya, and suggestive 155
of Anna Krylova’s theory of non-oppositional gender mobilization during war. There is not a 
barrier against depicting Zoya as both feminine and armed. Even the decision to make Zoya the 
first female Hero of the Soviet Union shows the wartime willingness to allow for gender-neutral 
heroism. Their placement in prominent urban settings forced popular engagement and 
confrontation with Zoya’s memory. Rather than physically separated or cloistered off into a 
deliberately crafted site, the public is faced with Zoya’s visage when they may not have sought it 
out. Combined with her depiction in the Arnshtam’s ​Zoya​, there was a brief period of time in 
which women could be shown as eager and able to engage with violence in defense of the nation, 
154 Harris 2012, 77. 
155 Harris 2011, 280. 
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rather than the type of detachment or ambitious competitiveness shown by Pavlichenko in her 
2016 biopic. 
The statue of Zoia-as-partisan in Novodevichy, however, was replaced in 1986 with one 
designed by Oleg Komov, where Zoya-as-victim is the primary aesthetic effect. Zoya’s full body 
is depicted, knees bent and body contorted so that her head is tilted back and her chest is pushed 
outward (see Figure 14). Adrienne Harris takes the perspective that it is the resurrection of Zoya 
to “wholeness”; her breast, mutilated after her death, has been restored. It is her at “the moment 
she transcends mortality”.  Platt views it instead as Zoya in ecstasy, with her body’s 156
resurrection to wholeness creating a reading of the hero in jouissance - her pain commuted to 
pleasure now that her wounds have been healed.  In an opposing viewpoint, it is also the most 157
prominent statue of Zoya in a now-heavily touristed area of Moscow, and the one which most 
closely resembles the photograph of her corpse. Although interpreted by some as depicting Zoya 
falling as in flight, suggestive of an angel - or ‘like the cry of a bird, halted at its most sonorous 
note’ - overlaying the Strunnikov photograph with one of the statue shows that it seeks to capture 
the same moment and expression.  The head is tilted back in the same manner, with the angle 158
now cast in the reflection of a neck broken by a noose, and her shirt is torn open to show the 
disfigured breast. While the reconstructed breast could be, as Harris phrases it, a transfiguration 
post-mortem into a whole body once again, alternative explanations could be that her femininity 
is now being re-emphasized through a more prominent bust, or a statue of a disfigured corpse 
would have been found to be repellent by those visiting Novodevichy. Although she discusses it 
156 Ibid, 282. 
157 Platt, 48. 
158 Platt, 64-65. 
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within the context of the Orthodox Church’s theological distaste for Lenin’s embalmed and 
unburied corpse, Verdery points to the ingrained Russian cultural belief that the dead must be 
buried. “If someone is not buried or is buried improperly (or if ​ab​normal [sic] people are given a 
“normal” burial), then bad things will happen. Because an unburied body is a source of things 
not being quite right in the cosmos…”  This suggests, in some way, that the treatment of 159
Kosmodemyanskaya’s body violated heavenly law which, in combination of her youth and 
womanness, was too thoroughly a taboo broken for all in the Soviet Union to stand. In this sense, 
Zoya’s whole body is metaphorically buried via the statue’s erection in the cemetery, and 
theological values have not been transgressed. Conservative tastes have been satisfied. 
On theology, Zoya as a Soviet ‘saint’ is a frequent description, and this depiction comes 
through in the other categorization of her memorials - the idealized form. Arguably Zoya was 
able to become so known due to the ability to map her narrative onto that of a Christian martyr; 
tortured, refusing to renounce her beliefs, and dying for them. The actual act performed on her - 
the mutilation of her breast - recalls specific saints such as Agatha of Sicily . These statues are 160
most frequently found at sites of ‘pilgrimage’ - such as Zoya’s birthplace in Osino-Gay or in 
Petrishchevo where she perished (see ​Figures 14 and 15​). ​Alongside the statue of Zoya which 
currently stands in Moscow’s Victory Museum (see Figure 12), these pieces differ stylistically 
but all show Zoya barefoot, clad in a gown, standing proud and saintly. Instead the saintly 
symbolism can be read as politically deliberate - opting to code an ideological death in religious 
iconography, both making her narrative palatable to a nation of believers and creating a 
159 Verdery, 45. 
160 “In Byzantine martyr legends, women’s nipples or breasts were often severed in sexualized 
torture”. Constantinou, 22 quoted in Harris 2011, 293.  
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replacement, whose feats were for communism, for nonsecular icons. The pieces in Petrischevo 
and the Victory Museum in particular are extremely evocative of depictions of Joan of Arc being 
marched to her execution - unclad of any armor and weapons yet confident, as if aware that a 
higher power watches out for her. The comparison to Joan of Arc is so ubiquitous as to become a 
cliche, but a key similarity is the two martyrs’ virginity. For again referring to Adrienne Harris: 
Russian authors and artists have always been convinced of Zoia’s chastity and the 
violation of her pure body during her ​podvig​ [sic]. [Stavroula]Constantinou notes that 
most legends of female martyrs can be characterized by a preoccupation with sexuality 
and the martyrs’ virginity. ...Numerous allusions to [Zoya’s] violated chastity 
demonstrate that this aspect of her narrative penetrated the Soviet citizenry to its core, 
feeding the need to see the enemy as wholly evil and brutal.  161
 
Initially in 1942, the media bombarded the Soviet public with two contradictory 
photographs of Zoia: Strunnikov’s post-mortem photograph and Zoia’s school portrait. 
The visual discrepancy between these two bodies led to the persistent rumors that Zoia 
was not the “Tania” executed in Petrischevo. In the early mythopoeic process, this 
disconnect led to her body functioning as an empty vessel and site for others’ projections. 
When juxtaposed with each other, contradictory depictions of Zoia’s body as both 
prepubescent and as voluptuous draw attention to her youth and her lost potential as wife 
and mother, a common theme in literary texts about Zoia.   162
 
Platt elaborates on the tension between these depictions of Zoya; in his analysis, there is 
an erotic factor to her death and photographs, and the nature of her death recalls a revulsion in 
the viewer. “The striking beauty of the executed woman, along with the uncomfortable eroticism 
of the harrowing image, made it one of the most memorable of the war.”  When faced with the 163
paradigm, the post-Stalinist Soviet Union took to revirginizing Zoya. The armed and warlike 
depiction of the female combatant was no longer deemed as acceptable for a role model to 
161 Harris 2011, 293; Stavroula Constantinou, ​Female Corporeal Performances: Reading the 
Body in Byzantine Passions and the Lives of Holy Women ​(Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2005) 22 
quoted in Ibid, 293. 
162 Ibid, 294 
163 Platt, 48. 
77 
contemporary women and recalled too much the image of her as an active agent capable of 
fighting and dying.  Instead, the statues that emphasized femininity with their dresses and 164
delicate forms were appropriate. So much so that previous depictions breaking this rule had to be 
altered; in wartime, the gender hierarchy had been disrupted along with societal norms that 
would have otherwise never allowed Strunnikov’s photograph to be published initially. 
Referencing the Kukryniksy painting again, its original 1942 presentation showed, instead of 
Zoya giving her final call to Stalin, the moment when the noose tightened and the executioner's 
block kicked out from underneath her feet (see Figure 11). This was changed before its 1947 
version, which is the one which presently hangs in the Moscow gallery.  The Zoya which 165
stands in Osino-Gay wears clothing reminiscent of a schoolgirl or Pioneer uniform, where 
school-aged girls in the 1970s and 1980s could see themselves directly reflected in this heroine 
and model. However, despite this redirection onto femininity in the hopes of recapturing the 
contemporary female gaze, by the 1980s  and ​glasnost, ​the hagiographic elements in her 166
depiction had begun to lose their effect and the canonization of Zoya as a secular, socialist saint 
had become unpalatable. Challenges to the official narrative had started to take root, which 
would see an explosion of controversy surrounding Zoya’s till-then codified story and biography.
 167
164 Harris 2011, 281-282. 
165 Platt, 62-63. 
166 Harris points out that this was not a phenomenon new to the 1980s and Gorbachev’s reforms: 
“According to dissident Ludmilla Alexeyeva, already by 1950 some Komsomol volunteers did 
not want to deliver lectures about Kosmodem’ianskaia: ‘Her story had become stale with 
repetition. On top of that, there were competing, unofficial versions of the events in 
Petrischevo””. Ludmilla Alexeyva and Paul Goldbert, ​The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in 
the Post-Stalin Era ​(University of Pittsburg Press, 1993), 61 quoted in Harris 2011, 287. 
167 Ibid, 286-291. 
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The 1990s saw, along with the end of the Soviet Union, a brief moment when 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung could have been possible in the then-fledgling Russian Federation. 
Adrienne Harris has observed that “In the post-Soviet period, individuals attacked the 
univocality of the Soviet historical narrative, tearing down previously exalted mythic figures, 
when it became clear that Soviet history had largely been constructed of lies and thus, 
undermined the whole system”.  However, the war was a controversial topic - mnemonic 168
warriors long silenced now seizing on an opportunity to release nearly fifty years of censored 
views, and Zoya’s intimate connection with war memory saw an attempt at diversifying the 
narrative. ​In 1991, publications in Moscow weekly newspaper ​Argumenti i Fakti​ by A. Zhovtis 
put forward the claim that there had been no German military presence in Petrischevo, and the 
burning of the village by partisans was the result of their over-eagerness to implement “scorched 
earth tactics”. Namely, that due to their willingness to follow Stalin, Russians and Russian 
property had been needlessly harmed.  The controversy released by these publications created 169
or released other conspiracy theories surrounding Zoya’s actions - that she had been 
schizophrenic, that she was a fanatic rather than a patriot, that the burning of Petrischevo was 
misattributed to Zoya, or that the corpse had not been hers at all. However, the reaction writ large 
was to condemn the articles with proclamations that “Zoya has been executed again” - an 
unwillingness by readers to suffer the besmirchment of her legacy; the controversy quieted after 
a criminal investigation could not produce any new evidence to challenge the established 
memory regime.  Vladimir Kharchenko-Kulikovski released a documentary in 2005 that 170
168 Ibid, 303.  
169 “Легенды Великой Отечественной. Зоя Космодемьянская,” April 5, 2006, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20051227015937/http://www.smi.ru/05/04/05/3442763.html​. 
170 Harris 2011, 291.  
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repeated the findings of that 1991 investigation - ​“Pravda o podvige Zoi Kosmodem’ianskoi”​ ​- 
which was praised by critics for teaching young people not only facts about the war, but 
‘patriotism and love for their Motherland’.  Compounding this was the desecration of a 171
monument to Zoya in Volgograd - an image which read to many that not only was the vandal 
insulting a single individual (Zoya), but the legions of Soviet dead that had fallen in the Battle of 
Stalingrad.  The intertwining of these two memories into one single act of insult, which would 172
have forced officials to comply with restoring the monument regardless of their personal feelings 
on the subject. As a mnemonic moment, it demonstrates the results of when a warrior pushes too 
far and the possibility for deliberation breaks; rather than merely discussing the possibilities of 
falsehoods and exaggerations in Zoya’s myth, violence was leveled against her pseudo-corpse. 
Running semi-simultaneous was the movement to have Zoya canonized as an Orthodox saint - 
decades of having used hagiographic imagery to her now converging with the return of the 
Orthodox Church to political saliency and increasing identification of ‘Orthodox’ with ‘Russian’.
 By the decade’s end, not only had Putin’s rise to the presidency ushered in a close to potential 173
fracturing of the war - and Zoya’s - memory in Russia. At least, temporarily, until the next major 
moment of shifting territorial integrity within the Russian Federation.  
171 “Pravda o podvige Zoi Kosmodem’ianskoi”, ​Moskovskii veteran ​29-30 (2005): 6 quoted in 
Ibid, 295.  
172 Ibid, 296-298.  
173 Quoting Harris, “Re-contextualization of heroes like Zoia within an Orthodox framework may 
strengthen the Orthodox Church itself, for as John Garrard and Carol Garrard have shown, 
Patriarch Aleksii II sensed that the Church needed to link itself with the military and patriotism 
in order to revive and establish itself as a permanent force in society and took measures to do 
so.” John Garrard and Carol Garrard, ​Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New 
Russia​. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 86-245 quoted in Harris 2011, 301-302.  
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For 2016 - two years after the expansion of Russian borders - saw a second moment of 
potential fracturing of Zoya’s mnemonic regime, and for a second time saw its entanglement 
with war memory and an assault on a statue push critics into the category of desecrators and 
2016 saw the publication of cartoonist and psychiatrist Andrei Bilzho’s editorial in which he 
diagnoses Zoya with schizophrenia, while seemingly aware that the topic would produce the 
‘violent’ reaction it did illicit:  
Now I will tell a terrible, seditious thing that will blow up the Internet and me, but, thank 
God, I am now far away. ...Before the war, Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya was in [a 
psychiatric hospital] more than once, she suffered from schizophrenia. All the 
psychiatrists who worked in the hospital knew about this, but then her medical history 
was withdrawn, because when perestroika began, information began to leak out, and 
Kosmodemyanskaya's relatives began to be outraged that this offends her memory.   174
 
Here, however, unlike the 1991 ​Argumenti i Fakti ​articles, Bilzho is not attempting to 
challenge or alter the narrative around Zoya’s actions in Petrischevo or her death. Yet it 
produced nearly as much outrage as those articles from more than a decade before, because 
instead of actions her character was being questioned. It was as sacrilegious to suggest that she 
could have been mentally ill as it was to suggest she had been in Petrischevo unjustly . Again 175
correlating to this event is the desecration of the ​statue of Zoya which had stood in Kyiv, Ukraine 
(Figure 13); in 2016, first vandalized and then stolen off the street entirely.  One of more than 176
174 Андрей Бильжо, “Диагноз недели с доктором Бильжо: Мединский никакой не историк, 
а 29-й панфиловец и есть,” ​The Insider​, December 9, 2016,​ ​https://theins.ru/opinions/38959​. 
175 Although it is to suggest that the 1991 controversy also contained strong implications on 
questioning Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya’s mental state, with the insinuation that she had been 
deluded by Stalinist scorched earth tactics into burning down buildings.  
176 “В Киеве вандалы разрисовали и повалили памятник Зое Космодемьянской,” ​Лента.ру​, 
September 5, 2016, sec. Украина,​ ​https://lenta.ru/news/2016/09/05/vandals/​;  Александр 




500 monuments to Soviet-era notables vandalized in Ukraine between 2014 and 2016, it 
becomes symbolic in that Ukrainian anger against Russia following the annexation of Crimea 
was taken out on female figureheads associated with the Soviet (by proxy, Russian) mnemonic 
regime.  Read in this sense, Zoya’s presence as a statue is a reminder not only of the prevalence 177
of Soviet myths, but of the forced acceptance of the official regime upon a population. Attacks 
against the female pseudo-corpse show a relief of humiliation at having been subjected to the 
mnemonic regimes even after independence, to sweep back to the claims made by Merridale 
about what men had felt when women first entered military service in the Red Army.  
Two decades after the death of the Soviet Union, Zoya has survived despite the repeated 
assaults on her memory. Largely this has been due to the symbolism attributed to her early on in 
her post-death second life as a symbol, even when the ideological nature of her actions in life are 
no longer palatable to a post-Soviet Russian world. The complexity of these symbolisms, layered 
with deep connections to both the particularly Russian condition and an intense intergenerational 
emotional response, have allowed certain elements of her story - femininity or saintliness or 
wartime patriotism - to become prominent depending most upon the needs of the time. This 
however comes with the awareness that attacks on her memory could be attacks against any of 
the myriad ideas that her memory has stood for. In this, she rather uniquely appears 
chameleon-esque in the intersection of identities her corpse and its representations have been 
able to inhabit. 
ml​; “В Киеве разрисовали и свалили памятник Зое Космодемьянской,” ​Взгляд; Деловая 
газета​, 2016,​ ​https://vz.ru/news/2016/9/5/830758.html​. 





The number of ethnic Kazakh women who were sent to the frontlines of the Great 
Patriotic War is given at over five thousand by the Kazakhstani government, although other 
figures suggest up to or surpassing seven thousand.  From them, two Kazakh women were 178
made Heroes of the Soviet Union following their wartime deaths - the first was Mansuk 
Mametova, who received the title in 1944, and three months later Aliya ​Moldagulova was raised 
to the same level.​ ​Despite their fixation on lists of Kazakh dead from the Great Patriotic War, 
both are frequently a footnote in Russian-language accounts of the war, although scholarship on 
the intersectional identities of Kazakh and women in the Great Patriotic War has been increasing 
in Russian-language studies.  This absence is more indicative of a wider neglect of non-Slavic 179
and non-European Soviet soldiers, as well as the minimization of women’s efforts. These 
problems can be traced back to the war itself, where the Main Political Administration of the Red 
Army (PUKKA) itself treated Central Asian soldiers as an ‘afterthought’. The neglect persists to 
the present day, as in a comprehensive look at the historiography of Kazakh women in the Great 
Patriotic War, historians ​Z.G. Saktaganova and K.K. Abdrakhmanova wrote that, ​“And to this 
day, unfortunately, Kazakhstan's comprehensive monographic works on women's history in the 
war years have not appeared.”  The inclusion of both women when mentioning Kazakh, and 180
178 Дина Игсатова, “У войны не женское лицо...,” Республиканский 
общество-политический журнал, June 3, 2019,​ ​http://mysl.kazgazeta.kz/?p=13613​. 
179 З. Г. Сактаганова and К. К. Абдрахманова, “Советская и современная казахстанская 
историография проблемы «Женщины Казахстана в годы Великой Отечественной войны»,” 
Вестник КарГУ​, 2018,​ ​https://articlekz.com/article/29617​. 
180 Russian: И до сегодняшнего дня, к сожалению, казахстанских комплексных 
монографических работ по женской истории в военные годы так и не появилось. Ibid.  
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female Kazakh, contributions is frequently deliberate, and to a particular degree their memories 
have become intertwined with each others’. Despite this, however, Mametova has more statues 
and memorials in her home country , one of the few female figures that has broken out from the 181
ranks to stand as not only a symbol of Kazakh people’s efforts in the Great Patriotic War but as a 
figure in the pantheon of national heroes - a position that she is able to be afforded by virtue of 
her association with the war.   
During the 1940s, Mametova was a figure vital to the PURKKA’s effort to glorify 
Kazakh Red Army soldiers. Why? Roberto Carmack posits this and in turn yields the floor to 
Anna Krylova and Karel Berkhoff for possible explanations as to why Mametova and her fellow 
female soldier, Aliya Moldagulova, became key figures in the Kazakh heroic pantheon. Krylova 
suggests that “Soviet wartime propagandists deliberately sought to erase any discrepancy 
between femininity and combat duty by portraying these components of female military identity 
as fully compatible”; in contrast, Berkhoff posits that “descriptions of brave Soviet women on 
the battlefield implicitly called into question the adequacy of male soldiers”, and that Mametova 
and Moldagulova’s heroics cast a disparaging light on the masculinity of Kazakh soldiers, who 
ought to step up and reclaim their honor as men and soldiers.   182
However, in fear that more contemporary events in the 20th, 19th or even 18th centuries 
could be cast in a colonial vs independence struggle, party organs in 1942 used older historical 
181 Aliya Moldagulova appears to have more monuments and memorials within the territory of 
the Russian Federation, with statues in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Rybinsk. While a closer 
analysis of Moldagulova is beyond the scope of this thesis, it can be speculated that her actions 
in the defense of Leningrad and service in the European regions of Russia have helped make her 
memory more prominent in the western portions of the former Soviet Union. Галя Галина, 
“Дочь Лениниграда,” accessed July 25, 2020, 
https://www.np.kz/2010/04/16/doch_leningrada.html​. 
182 Krylova, Berkhoff quoted in Carmack 2014, 105. 
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figures and struggles (eg., Tauke Khan and the fight against the Dzungars in the late 17th 
century) to instill national-patriotic fire in Kazakh troops. After 1944, this was projected even 
further into the distant past - to the ancestors of the Turkic peoples in Central Asia in their 
struggles against Alexander the Great or Chingis Khan. The key elements of this in-progress 
narrative were “simultaneous resistance to foreign invaders and indigenous exploiter 
collaborators” and “the Kazakhs as an eternally militant albeit divided people”.  “Memoirs 183
written by Kazakh veterans and published during the ​glasnost ​and post-Soviet periods suggest 
that these troops identified strongly with the core messages disseminated by PURKKA. It was 
not uncommon for Kazakh soldiers to express notions of Soviet patriotism by referring to 
Kazakh historical figures”. Some of these trends were later resurrected by the Nazarbayev 
government and post-independence Kazakh historical-cultural institutions.  Carmack states 184
that, “PURKKA’s sustained attempt to instil a complementary Soviet-Kazakh identity 
distinguishes the Soviet Union from other World War II-era combatants who fielded multi-ethnic 
armies”, comparing to the British propaganda efforts against the development of East African or 
Indian identities that could contradict a united British identity during the war. Nevertheless, 
while Kazakh-language propaganda never strayed from its goal of dual identity formation, “the 
balance between these two facets shifted in favour of [Soviet] by war’s end”.  Yet he concludes 185
by stating that eventually the Communist Party lost interest in looking at non-Russian epics for 
inspirational propaganda, and Stalin and other high-ranking officials ceased tolerating any 
depictions of conflicts between Russians and non-Russians, “as [by 1944] the Russian people 
183 Ibid, 103-104. 
184 Ibid, 108. 
185 Ibid, 108. 
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had become so central to notions of Soviet patriotism that any negative reference to them 
whatsoever threatened to destabilize the entire propagandistic edifice”.   186
Knowing this, it becomes interesting when viewing the 1969 film made of Manshuk 
Mametova’s feat, which despite its title of ​Song of Manshuk  is less of a biographical account 187
than it is a war film featuring aspects of her life and death. Despite having both a Kazakh 
director and star, Majit Begalin and his wife Natalya Arinbacarova, ​Song of Manshuk ​depicts 
Mametova primarily as another soldier within the larger events of the Red Army at the Battle of 
Nevel. She is frequently shown among crowds of soldiers where the camera does not zoom in 
upon her, and her death is cut short by the film’s end rather than lingering over it as seen in 
earlier works such as ​Zoya​. In a sense, it is a more a film about a Kazakh soldier’s experience of 
the war rather than a woman’s, with its documentary shaky-cam cuts to scenes of wheat fields 
and nomadic hunting groups in the Kazakh SSR represented as a utopia the war has taken 
soldiers away from, rather than a subjective childhood that Mametova has lost by going to the 
frontline. The film’s year of production is significant in that it culminates a decade which had 
seen renewed scholarly work and interest in Kazakh contribution to the war; the twentieth 
anniversary of the victory saw “​8 books, 24 brochures and more than 200 articles were published 
in the republic, and by 1970 about 900 books, brochures, scientific and popular scientific articles 
on military and logistical topics had been published in the republic. ...But in these works, the 
plots about women during the war years are extremely limited, Kazakh researchers practically 
ignore this problem.”  With this in mind, Mametova in Begalin’s film became a vehicle for 188
186 Ibid, 103-104. 
187 Russian: ​Песень о Маншук.  
188 Сактаганова and Абдрахманова, “Советская и современная казахстанская 
историография проблемы «Женщины Казахстана в годы Великой Отечественной войны».” 
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awareness of Kazakh contribution to the war effort to a wider Soviet audience. It integrates 
pieces of archetypical Kazakh imagery - fields of wheat, falcon hunting on horseback, ethnic 
song - into what by-then would have been a rote-standard war film to Soviet audiences, with its 
sweeping battlefield shots and scenes of uniformed men in dark rooms discussing strategy. It 
reinjects Kazakh soldiers and their contributions back into the war, but in this sense, Mametova’s 
gender is not factored into the narrative in any way stronger than a small romantic subplot. 
In independent Kazakhstan, particularly in the last decade, there has been a great effort in 
lifting up Manshyk Mametova to the level of national hero and inscribing her name to Kazakh, 
rather than a blended Soviet-Kazakh, history. These efforts by the government have seen her 
name attributed to mountains and lakes - there is both Manshuk Mametova Lake and Lake of the 
Glacier Manshuk Mametova within driving distance of Almaty - as well as universities and 
medical schools, with the association that she had studied medicine briefly before the outbreak of 
the war.  The prescribing of Mametova’s name into the landscape of Kazakhstan 189
metaphorically integrates her into the body of the country itself, rendering her deeds - and 
particularly, her heroism - as indissoluble to Kazakhstan as the steppe or the mountains. 
Furthermore, there have been historiographical attempts at placing Mametova as a twentieth 
century incarnation of a heritage, where women have always been present.  In this report by ​The 
Astana Times​, the service of Kazakh women in the Red Army is directly connected to the ancient 
and the native:  
Kazakh people have always admired their daughters for their beauty, intelligence and 
courage. The women of the great steppe always held high status in the socio-political 
189 “Museum of ‘Hero of Soviet Union Manshuk Mametova’ and ‘History of University,’” 




hierarchy of Kazakh governments. In Kazakhstan’s nomadic tradition, women have 
always been equal to men in everything, including work and war. 
 
Women have been powerful in what is now Kazakhstan since the early Iron Age, when 
women joined men on the battlefield. The percentage of female warriors fluctuated at 
times, but they were always present.  190
 
Manshuk Mametova is no different from Queen Tomyris or Princess Bopay-Khansha, 
and an incarnation of that nomadic tradition during a time when Kazakhs were denied their 
heritage. “The frequent celebration of ancient and modern heroes’ anniversaries contributes to 
making [the potential division of Kazakhstan into three parts due to tribalism] a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. These anniversaries aim at strengthening all-Kazakh self-consciousness, but in reality 
they strength the ambition of the informal leaders of the three ​zhues " . Both Mametova and 191 192
Moldagylova have seen the production of television specials as part of the series ​Tainhi, Cydbi, 
Imena  produced by one of the largest state news agencies, Khabar TV, aimed at promoting 193
important Kazakhs throughout history. These specials aim at not only promoting the names and 
narratives of these women, but at correcting misconceptions about their biographies; for instance, 
a particularly noteworthy element of Mametova’s special is on her childhood. With actors 
brought in to show a child Mametova playing in the family home while parents watch, the 
narration and guest experts explain away why she went to live with an aunt and uncle instead of 
with her nuclear family. No mention is made of her father’s arrest by Soviet police, which is 
found in other biographical material. In short, it not only presents Mametova in a favorable, 
190 Maral Zhanataykzy, “Nation Remembers Warrior Women of the Great Steppe,” ​The Astana 
Times​, March 13, 2013, sec. People, 
https://astanatimes.com/2013/03/nation-remembers-warrior-women-of-the-great-steppe/​. 
191 Lit. ‘hundred’, meaning hordes in the sense of tribal division. Kazakh society consists of three 
regionally organized ​zhuz. ​Galiev, 57. 
192 Ibid, 59. 
193 ​Russian:​ ​Тайны, Судьбы, Имена ​, 
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heroic light, but the home and culture that she came from, accompanied by an aesthetic which 
seamlessly blends Kazakh carpets and textiles with vintage Soviet appliances and goods.  The 194
program’s production of specials on both Mametova and Moldagylova again represents that 
historiographical push to include their memories as part of a long line of great Kazakhs but also 
to detach the ‘Sovietness’ from their deeds and actions. Simultaneously, it nationalizes and 
reclaims them, while not explicitly seeking to completely erase the influence from Russian 
culture.  
Kazakh intellectuals live in a perpetual shadow of trying to prove that their culture is as 
rich as that of the Russians, and of working through a pre-Russian cultural past in search of 
aspects which can be used in a highly secularized modern age. The nomadic past, rather than the 
Islamic as seen in neighboring Central Asian states, is more quickly evoked, to the extent that 
Islam could even be described as “a foreign culture superimposed on the integral Kazakh 
nomadic culture”, with the strongest emphasis placed on kinship units.  Finally, and vitally, 195
qualities ascribed to Mametova in her depictions through agitprop could not be considered 
‘national’ in any significant way, insofar as those same qualities were being given to any heroic 
soldier in the Great Patriotic War, from Slavic to Tajik. Roberto Carmack puts forth that “the 
only characteristics of [Mametova and Moldagylova] that were specifically Kazakh...were their 
names and places of origins”, and that similarities they shared with other Soviet Red Army 
heroes was an intentional thrust of state propaganda work. Insofar that national agendas could be 
subscribed to the ascension of these women to the status of Soviet heroes was Communist Party 
194 “«Тайны. Судьбы. Имена». Маншүк Маметова,” ​Тайны. Судьбы. Имена​ (Хабар, n.d.), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35MfD6vziRs&t=303s​. 
195 Martha Brill Olcott, ​The Kazakhs​, Second, Studies of Nationalities (Stanford, Calif: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1987). 
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efforts to ‘raise’ the status of Central Asian women from the ‘oppression’ of premodern Central 
Asian-Islamic societies. Charles Shaw demonstrates this throughout his dissertation in discussion 
of Uzbek women on the homefront in the war; the relative lack of Uzbek women serving on the 
frontlines did not stop the Party from finding “new women” who, in roles such as entertainers or 
kolkhoz farmers, represent the successes of Moscow-backed modernization in the region.  By 196
using Mametova and Moldagylova as figures within Kazakh-language propaganda, PURKKA - 
and by extension, the Communist Party and state - were putting Kazakh women on the same 
level as Kazakh men, and proving the success of the Soviet mission to bring its gender 
egalitarianism to the patriarchal societies of Central Asian republics.   197
In a prominent square in the city of Almaty is a massive statue (see Figure 16) depicting 
both Manshuk Mametova and Aliya Moldagylova marching nearly arm-in-arm; behind them 
stands a globe upon which cherubic figures release doves of peace. Read literally, the woman - 
depicted armed, stern-faced, in full military uniform - are marching with peace to follow behind 
their battle. It is a decidedly unfeminine depiction, and beneath them the medals serve to 
emphasize how they have been rewarded as soldiers rather than as saints or sacrifices. It is 
another source which shows the two women interconnected, despite Mametova and Moldagylova 
never serving together or being part of the same corps in the military. The duplication effect 
suggests that, instead of these women being two seperate outliers, that there is a strong basis of 
heroes to draw from; two women present in propaganda and statues amplify the strength of the 
196 Charles Shaw, “Making Ivan-Uzbek: War, Friendship of the Peoples, and the Creation of 
Soviet Uzbekistan, 1941-1945” (Doctoral Dissertation, Berkeley, Calif, University of California, 
Berkeley, 2015), 
https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Shaw_berkeley_0028E_15628.pdf​. 
197 Carmack, 105. 
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historical basis from which contemporary government officials draw from. Two additional 
statues of Mametova stand in Nevel and Uralsk (see Figures 17 and 18) which follow in the mold 
of the militaristic and proud soldier. The exception to these consistencies memorials is, vitially, 
the statue of Mametova which stands in front of her memorial museum in Uralsk (see Figure 19). 
Here instead, she is shown in a dress, with her hair in braids and her hands holding flowers. 
While the motif of stepping forward is repeated from the Almaty square statue, she is distinctly 
feminized as compared to her standard showings. The caption underneath then paradoxically 
reads ​“Neprovotimaya Manshuk” ​- “Unparalleled Manshuk”  - suggestive of her 198
exceptionalism that had earned her the Hero of the Soviet Union.​ ​The discrepancy in appearance 
is explained by its location; the House-Museum of Manshuk Mametova was formed out of the 
home she and her adopted family lived in for a period of the time in the 1930s, and a domestic 
Manshuk Mametova is the one who stands to welcome visitors to its entrance. Rather than the 
soldier, which is how the public knows her, this statue of her out of uniform shows both that 
visitors will be entering her private, civilian abode, and that it is meant to depict the homefront 
which she came from and fought for. The change in garb and the feminine adornments - a 
non-military hat, flowers, braids - all reinforce the connection between the feminine and the 
homefront, separate from the masculinized war which took away these elements from this young 
girl.  
There is, however, a limit to variation allowed, and it comes when the stylistic depictions 
come from outside of the government’s purview. 2019 saw the unexpected addition of a 
hand-carved wooden statue in Victory Park in the northeastern town of Semey stated by the artist 
198 Russian: ​Неповторимая Маншук 
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to be of Mametova (see Figure 20), and both official and popular responses were negative on the 
grounds that it did not depict her in accordance to any official sources. Users of social 
networking sites such as VK and Instagram wrote various captions critiquing the aesthetic 
qualities of the statue: “Sorry, but it's just plain ugly”, “Where is the artistic advice? Who 
allows? Some kind of blasphemy”, “Manshuk Mametova is very beautiful in the photographs 
and in the movies, but what is this, the appearance here is really ugly, and then made of wood, 
bad taste, sorry”.  City officials agreed but rather than the piece’s aesthetic qualities, rejected it 199
on the grounds of failing to match the dignity of the space that it had been placed in: “Perhaps 
the subjects of the Great Patriotic War and the material, as well as the processing technique 
associated with it, were not taken into account during the implementation of the project.”  200
Despite the response of the artist arguing that it ‘shouldn’t matter if it's made of wood or 
marble’, the statue was later removed from the Victory Park on orders, though some controversy 
persists on who was responsible for issuing such.  201
Government monopoly on mnemonic productions and activities extends out from the 
erection of statues. Local and national authorities have taken control over events such as the 
199 Russian: "Извините, но это просто некрасиво", "Где худсовет? Кто разрешает? 
Кощунство какое-то", "Маншук Маметова на фотографиях и в кино очень красивая, а это 
что такое, здесь внешность очень ужасная, еще из дерева, безвкусица, жаль". 
Рабига Дюсенгулова, “Автор ответила критикам деревянной Маншук Маметовой,” 




201 Рабига Дюсенгулова, “Деревянную скульптуру Маншук Маметовой убрали из парка 




Immortal Regiment’s marches on Victory Day.  Historian Timothy Garton Ash would argue 202
that the lack of a collective memory is the lack of a collective identity - “a national or any 
political community without memory is likely to be childish” - and though the empirical 
evidence in support of such a claim could be debated, less so is the evidence that political 
mnemonic actors behave as though the statement were true.  In the Kazakhstani example, there 203
is ample evidence to suggest a real fear in the minds of elites that without a shared - and agreed 
upon - Kazakh history that extends from prehistoric times to modernity, that their modern state 
risks fragmentation or complete disintegration. Following in the model of Kosmodemyanskaya’s 
‘rehabilitation’ from Soviet icon to specifically Russian, the circumstances of Mametova’s 
actions during the war has allowed her to be held up as an ethno-nationalist hero as popular 













202 Chris Rickleton, “Kazakhstan: World War II Parade Puts Local Authorities in a Bind,” 
Eurasianet, May 10, 2018, 
https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-world-war-ii-parade-puts-local-authorities-in-a-bind​. 




While disparate in several notable ways, comparisons between the three women are both 
possible and illuminating. Kosmodemyanskaya and Mametova both have managed to separate 
themselves from the identity of a purely ideological hero and martyr and become connected to 
the ethnicities of their respective successor states - Zoya as a Russian and Orthodox icon, and 
Mametova as a sample of the enduring spirit of Kazakh women. Even Pavlichenko to a degree 
has been able to pull away from the ideology of the war and the Soviet Union, although this is a 
turn far more recent and less pervasive than the previous two. This, of course, is due to the 
longer history of memorialization for the former two combatants than the latter; the dead make 
for more compelling stories than the living. Notably as well, the relative sparseness of 
biographical information and details about them at key early moments in the mythologicalization 
process meant that they could capture the Soviet, Russian, and Kazakh imaginations more 
strongly than a highly decorated and known woman. 
While it appears anticlimactic to conclude that the dead are more compelling than the 
living, it highlights a particular aspect of women in war that could otherwise be overlooked. The 
assumption is that women are meant to die in war - as victims, as the homefront that could not be 
defended accurately. In ​Battle for Sevastopol​, when the character of Eleanor Roosevelt looks at 
Pavlichenko’s back full of healed bullet wounds, she is prompted to ask “where were the men to 
defend you” rather than express amazement at Pavlichenko’s survival. The deaths of 
Kosmodemyanskaya and Mametova, regardless of what they did or did not do in life, confirm 
that fact. Their deaths are a correction of the aberration of their combat experiences; 
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Pavlichenko’s survival is what should not have occurred. As such, the victim or martyr imagery 
is much more apt and palatable to post-Soviet cultures, regardless of ethnic differences.  
Despite the exceptionalism that each woman is ascribed with - from preternatural sniping 
skills, to heaven- or Stalin-given acknowledgement - individual personality traits are not brought 
to light. Even when the mother of one of the women, Lybov Kosmodemyanskaya, is present to 
influence the narrative, the symbolism swallows the subject. Wartime narratives reject 
characteristics beyond valor and sacrifice. In lieu of interiority, the physicality of the women 
become the forefront, and time has narrowed the criteria they can display. Each successive 
decade has seen more depictions which emphasize beauty of feminine delicacy - 
Kosmodemyanskaya’s statues lose their association with weaponry and warfare to the extent that 
she is shown in a thin gown and barefoot more than she is with a rifle in hand. These depictions 
suggest that when femininity is the most dominant characteristic, their ideological association 
can be minimized, and thus they are acceptable historical and mnemonic figures when ideology 
can be complicated in modern memory politics. The acceptance of Mametova as a Kazakh hero 
rather than a victim of a non-Kazakh/Russian war, even when overall the Soviet past in 
Kazakhstan is a fractured regime, speaks to this effect.   204
Even seventy-five years after the war’s end, the Great Patriotic War is still able to unite 
disparate people behind its heroes when there is a core flexibility to their identities. Notably, 
each case lacks a very strong presence during the decades between the war’s end and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union; each woman saw a resurgence of interest, even in the form of 
204 Ski Krieger, “Victory Day in Kazakhstan: Bittersweet Memories of WWII,” Travelmag, 
February 4, 2020, 
https://www.travelmag.co.uk/2020/02/victory-day-in-kazakhstan-bittersweet-memories-of-wwii/​. 
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controversy, between the 1990s and the 2010s. Even in Zoya’s case, where she had been a figure 
of note with new statues put up in the 1960s through the 1980s, she saw a second life during 
transfiguration from Soviet to Russian icon. Due to this, we can conclude with Breev - that 
women were lesser known, vaguer, more capable of being imagined, and can be treated flexibly 
in media and depictions. For to conclude, no matter what Svetlana Alexevich wrote in ​The 
Unwomanly Face of War, ​or how many statues can be erected and movies made presenting 
female combatants as exceptional or sublime, they are always reconfigured for the needs of the 
present rather than for the deeds in the past. Despite the evidence presented in this thesis and the 
terms female combatants are discussed in, ​Ekaterina Solovyova of the Russian War Historical 
Society still found a way to say, “It is clear that the war can not be idealized, it was not only feats 
– it was both dirty and scary. But when we write or talk about it, we must always be as correct as 











205 Russian: Понятно, что войну нельзя идеализировать, это были не только подвиги – было 
и грязно, и страшно. Но когда мы пишем или говорим об этом, нужно всегда быть 
максимально корректными, бережными к памяти о тех людях.  Екатерина Соловьева, 






Appendix A - Visual Media 
 
 
Figure 1: “In memory of L. M. Pavlichenko memorial signs are installed in the cities of Odessa 
(on the house where L. M. Pavlichenko worked in 1941), Sevastopol (on the house No. 1 on 
Pavlichenko street (the building of the Prosecutor's office of the city of Sevastopol), Moscow (in 
the columbarium of the Novodevichy cemetery)”   206
 
206 “В память о Л.М. Павличенко установлены памятные знаки в городах Одессе (на доме, 
в котором в 1941 году работала Л.М. Павличенко), Севастополе (на доме №1 по улице 
Павличенко (здание прокуратуры города Севастополя), Москве (в колумбарии 
Новодевичьего кладбища).” “Героини обороны Одессы Нина Онилова и Людмила 




Figure 2: ​Monument for Second Siege of Sevastopol. Built in 1967. Sculptor V.V.Yakovlev, 
architect I.E.Fialko. Pavlichenko is one of two women named on the monument, the other being 











Figure 3: Sergey Strunnikov, ​Photograph of the Corpse of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya​, January 



































Figure 10: Statue of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya at the Partizanskaya metro station in Moscow. 




Figure 11: ​Monument to Zoya Kosmodemyankaya in Novodevichy Cemetery​, Photograph, 





Figure 12: Statue of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya on display in the Victory Museum, Moscow. 














Figure 15: ​Monument to Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in the Village of Petrishchevo​, Photograph, 







Figure 16: ​Monument to Manshuk Mametova and Aliya Moldagylova  in Almaty, Kazakhstan​, 






















Figure 19: ​Statue of Manshuk Mametova before the Museum of Manshuk Mametova in Uralsk, 




























Appendix B - Biographical Information 
Lyudmila Pavlichenko 
 
Lyudmila Mikhailovna Pavlichenko, neé Belova, was born in the city of Belaya Tserkov 
in 1916, then part of the Russian Empire. Her father, Mikhail Ivanovich Belov, was an employee 
of the NKVD and his work moved the family to Kiev in 1932 when Lyudmila was sixteen; her 
mother, Elena Trofimovna, taught foreign languages in a girls’ school. Little is written about her 
husband, Aleksei Pvalichenko, although in Lyudmila’s own words - her “first, schoolgirl, love” 
was comparable to “the end of the world, a voluntary blindness, a loss of reason”. Their 
relationship produced one son, Rotislav (1932 - 2006), Pavlichenko’s only child. Prior to the 
war, she nearly completed a university education in history at Kiev University and held a job at 
the arsenal factory. She volunteered for the front at the war’s beginning, and became a sniper as 
part of the Independent Maritime Army and later the 25th Rifle Division, with which she 
participated in defense of Odessa and Sevastopol. Between August 1941 and May 1942, 
Pavlichenko reached the rank of lieutenant with a confirmed kill count of 309, the highest 
recorded total for a female sniper. After being injured in 1942, she never returned to the front 
and spent the remainder of the war as a propagandist, traveling to America, Canada and the 
United Kingdom as representative of the Soviet Union. By 1943, she had achieved the rank of 
major and was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, and twice received the 
Order of Lenin. She survived the war to finish her education and work as a professional historian 
with both Kiev University and Soviet Navy headquarters. Between 1967 and 1972, she wrote her 
memoirs, although they were first published in Russian only in 2015. In October 1974, she died 
117 
of a stroke, and was buried in Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow, alongside numerous other 
peoples of Russian historical significance.   207
Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya 
 
Zoya ​Anatolyevna​ Kosmodemyanskaya was born in Osino-Gay, a village in the Tambov 
Region in Central Russia, in September 1923. Her family relocated to Moscow when Zoya was 
young, and she participated in both the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol since the age of 
eleven. Following the beginning of the war, she became active in partisan activities which 
ultimately led her to the village of ​Petrishchevo on occupied territory, which is where she was 
captured by the German army after setting fire to a number of buildings. Tortured and 
interrogated, Zoya was eventually hung on 29 November, 1941; her body was left on display for 
a number of weeks. She was buried before the Red Army re-captured the area around 
Petrishchevo in January 1942. Her younger brother, Aleksandr Anatoyevich, would later 
posthumously receive the Hero of the Soviet Union award for his actions in the capture of 
territory near Königsberg.   208
 The sparseness of her biography here does not reflect a dearth of information but rather 
the controversy surrounding certain aspects of it. For instance, while it is known that the family 
moved to Siberia in 1929, the reasoning behind the move is subject to numerous explanations, 
ranging from ‘escaping an accusation’ to her father’s direct criticisms of collective farming to the 
207 Martin Pregler, “Foreword,” in ​Lady Death: The Memoirs of Stalin’s Sniper​, by Lyudmila 
Pavlichenko (Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2018), ix–xiii, ix; Pavlichenko, 1-52; Vinogradova, 
35-37. 
208 “Zoya’s Story,” n.d.,​ ​http://gammacloud.org/features/zoya/home.html​; “Prominent Russians: 
Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya,” Russiapedia, n.d., 
https://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/history-and-mythology/zoya-kosmodemyanskaya/​.  
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